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Abstract
Should we require companies to report the same amount of
income to the IRS as they report to their shareholders? The idea
behind “book/tax conformity” is that managers’ desire to increase
reported earnings would act as a check on their desire to minimize
taxable income, and vice versa. Some scholars have proposed a
comprehensive approach, adopting financial income as the basis
for corporate taxation. Legislators, meanwhile, have offered a
targeted approach that singles out equity compensation, which has
historically been a significant source of the “gap” between book
income and taxable income.
This Article argues that book/tax conformity carries
unexplored costs that reduce its attractiveness, at least in the
context of equity compensation (and quite possibly in other areas
as well). Conforming the employer’s tax treatment of stock and
options with the accounting rules creates a paradox for employeelevel taxation. Either employee taxation is also conformed to
book, which raises liquidity, fairness, and other concerns, or we
must diverge from section 83(h), which limits the employer’s
deduction to the amount included by the employee as income.
Severing this link between the employer’s deduction and the
employee’s inclusion would eliminate an important check on tax
gamesmanship that is analogous to the check that book/tax
conformity proponents seek to create. Conforming tax deductions
for options with book, in other words, may simply trade one form
of gamesmanship for another.
More broadly, book/tax conformity must be evaluated in light
of (1) the cost of other gamesmanship that may result from
conformity, (2) the availability of other means of combating
manipulation, (3) potential distortions in compensation design,
and (4) effects on the decision to be a private or public company.
We conclude that equity compensation should be excluded from
comprehensive book/tax conformity regimes, and one-off
proposals to conform employer taxation of stock and options with
book are probably misguided. On the other hand, we suggest that
if targeted conformity of equity compensation is desired, revising
the accounting rules for options to match those of stock
appreciation rights, which would yield conformity at the tax end
of the spectrum, possibly could improve upon the status quo.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The idea of harmonizing the corporate income tax and financial
accounting systems is alluring, as it would simultaneously place a check
on two types of wasteful gamesmanship. Managers could massage the
books to maximize reported earnings, or they could scheme to minimize
taxable income, but at least they could not do both at the same time.
Instead, gamesmanship would result in a cost in terms of either reported
earnings or taxable income.
Scholars and legislators have offered both comprehensive and
targeted book/tax conformity proposals. Comprehensive proposals, such
as that suggested by Professor Desai, generally advocate using reported
earnings as the base for corporate taxation with a few specific
modifications to preserve certain tax preferences, such as accelerated tax
depreciation.1 Most recently, Professor Shaviro has proposed a
comprehensive book/tax conformity plan that would increase corporate
taxable income by 50% of the difference between a firm’s book income
and its taxable income computed without the adjustment.2 Other
proposals3 are targeted more narrowly at equity compensation, a
particular non-conforming item that has historically accounted for the
largest chunk of the book/tax “gap.”4
1

See Mihir A. Desai, The Degradation of Reported Corporate Profits, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. (2005); Mitchell L. Engler, Corporate Tax Shelters and Narrowing the
Book/Tax “GAAP,” 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 539; Celia Whitaker, Bridging the
Book-Tax Accounting Gap, 115 YALE L.J. 680 (2005); George K. Yin, Getting Serious
About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from History, 54 S.M.U. L. REV. 209
(2001).
2
Daniel Shaviro, The Optimal Relationship Between Taxable Income and
Financial Accounting Income: An Analysis and a Proposal (NYU Law and Economics
Research Paper No. 07-38, Feb. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017073
(proposing that taxable income of large public corporations be adjusted by 50% of the
positive difference between an adjusted earnings figure and taxable income as
otherwise determined).
3
See Ending Corporate Tax Favors for Stock Options Act, S. 2116, 110th Cong.
(2007) (bill introduced by Senator Levin on Sept. 28, 2007 that would limit corporate
tax deductions for stock options to the amount recognized as an expense in financial
statements); Executive Stock Options: Should the IRS and Stockholders Be Given
Different Information?: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of
the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007)
(statement of Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of
the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs) [hereinafter Levin
statement]; Mihir A. Desai, Tax, Accounting Treatment of Stock Options Should Be the
Same, 115 TAX NOTES 1301 (2007) (reprinting testimony presented at the
subcommittee hearing chaired by Senator Levin).
4
See Mihir A. Desai, The Divergence Between Book and Tax Income, 17
NBER/TAX POL’Y & ECON. 169, 180 (2003) (finding that stock option exercise
accounted for the largest component of the gap between book and tax income in the
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The book/tax “gap” associated with equity compensation and other
items results from the fact that tax and accounting systems travel on
different tracks. The timing and amount of the tax deduction taken by
an employer for compensation delivered in the form of stock options or
restricted stock differs from the expense recorded for financial reporting
purposes.5 The book/tax “gap” for option compensation has narrowed
considerably in recent years, as a new financial accounting rule (SFAS
123R) requires the fair value of options to be expensed over the option
vesting period.6 Nonetheless, the measurement of equity compensation
expense for financial accounting purposes remains separate and distinct
from the tax calculation.
Book/tax conformity proponents note that the failure to use a single
measure of compensation expense allows firms to game the system:
they can artificially inflate accounting earnings without suffering a
corresponding increase in taxes. Likewise, they can shelter income from
tax without taking a hit to earnings.7 Because firms generally wish to
report high income to investors but low income to the IRS, conforming
employer-level book and tax treatment would provide a check on abuses
of both reporting systems.8
late 1990s); see also, OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,
APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM
ST
FOR THE 21 CENTURY 101 (White Paper, Dec. 20, 2007) (concluding that “while full
[book/tax] conformity might not be an appealing template for business tax reform,
policymakers should keep in mind the potential simplification benefits of more targeted
conformity”).
5
See infra Part II.A.
6
See FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
NO. 123 (REVISED 2004) [hereinafter SFAS 123R].
7
See Desai, supra note 1, at 171-192; Engler, supra note 1; Whitaker, supra note
1, at 691-93; Yin, supra note 1, at 25; Shaviro, supra note 2, at 24. A related concern
of some commentators is that in recent years aggregate tax deductions for option
compensation have far exceeded the aggregate expense reported to investors. See
Levin statement, supra note 3. However, as discussed infra, gaming aside, there
should be no bias between the expected values of options, which are recorded as an
expense, and their realized values, which are deducted for tax purposes. Thus, it is not
obvious that we should be concerned about book/tax differences aside from the gaming
potential.
8
See, Desai, supra note 1, at 190 (noting that closer book/tax conformity will
reduce managers’ opportunities to abuse discrepancies between the two systems);
Engler, supra note 1, at 545-49 (noting that comprehensive book/tax conformity might
reduce abuses, but concluding that such a proposal is unacceptably overbroad);
Shaviro, supra note 2, at 4 (“Absent our two-book system . . . corporate executives
would often be forced to choose between the earnings management goal of increasing
reported income and the tax planning goal of reducing it, rather than being able, in
many cases, to enjoy the best of both worlds”); Whitaker, supra note 1, at 697 (“By
linking the consequences of tax and book reporting, a unified system could make such
abusive accounting more painful and less attractive. If any increase in reported book
income also meant increased tax liability, or if intended tax losses had to appear in
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This Article argues that book/tax conformity carries unexplored
costs that reduce its attractiveness as a policy prescription, at least in the
context of equity compensation (and quite possibly in other areas as
well). Conforming the employer’s tax treatment of stock and options
with the accounting rules creates a paradox for employee-level taxation.
Either employee taxation is also conformed to book, which yields grant
date taxation and raises liquidity, fairness, and other concerns; or else we
must deviate from section 83(h), which limits the employer’s deduction
to the amount included by the employee as income. Severing the link
between the employer’s deduction and the employee’s income would
eliminate a check on tax gamesmanship that is analogous to the check
that book/tax conformity proponents seek to create. Simply conforming
employer tax deductions for equity to book, in other words, may trade
one form of gamesmanship for another.
More broadly, book/tax conformity must be evaluated in light of (1)
the cost of other gamesmanship that may result from book/tax
conformity, (2) the availability of other means of combating
manipulation, (3) potential distortions in compensation design, and (4)
effects on the decision to be a private or public company. We conclude
that equity compensation should be excluded from comprehensive
book/tax conformity regimes. Similarly, one-off proposals to conform
employer taxation of stock and options with book are misguided, at least
as currently proposed. On the other hand, we show that adjusting the
accounting treatment for stock options to mirror that of stock
appreciation rights would conform option book treatment to tax, largely
accomplish the goals of those advocating reform, and avoid the pitfalls
associated with option conformity at book. If politically feasible, this
alternative could represent an improvement over the status quo.
This Article is organized as follows. In Part II, we review the
relevant tax and accounting rules and the gaming incentives they create.
In Part III, we analyze the pros and cons of book/tax conformity as it
relates to equity compensation. Part IV concludes.

II. BACKGROUND

financial statements, the tradeoff would induce corporations to be cautious in reporting
to investors and would likely increase the amount of income reported to the IRS”); Yin,
supra note 1, at 227 (noting that using book earnings as the starting point for federal
taxation mitigates the incentive to abuse ambiguities in the tax code, but arguing that
accounting abuses and gaming would remain).
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We begin with a brief review of the current accounting, tax, and
disclosure rules applicable to equity compensation. We then consider
why these rules matter to managers and businesses, why firms might
manipulate the rules to over- or under-report compensation, and how
conformity might mitigate gaming.

A. Accounting, Tax Treatment, and Disclosure under the Current Rules

1. Financial Accounting for Equity Compensation
Ideally, financial accounting for stock, stock options, other equity
compensation instruments, and cash compensation should be consistent,
as each of these items reflects a cost of employee services. In the eyes
of most commentators, the current financial accounting rules largely
achieve that goal. Importantly, the anomalous treatment of stock options
was rectified by the Financial Accounting Standard Board’s (FASB’s)
adoption of SFAS 123R in 2004. But SFAS 123R did not fix
everything: a significant disparity between the accounting treatment of
options and economically equivalent stock appreciation rights still
remains.
Stock options. Since 2005, public companies have been required to
expense the expected value of options provided to employees as
compensation.9 Under the current accounting standard, companies must
first calculate the fair value of options as of the date of grant using the
Black-Scholes, binomial, or other appropriate option pricing model.10
Then, they must ratably record this amount as an expense over the
vesting period of the option.11 Under GAAP in force prior to 2005, no
expense had to be recorded with respect to standard options issued at or
9

See SFAS 123R, supra note 6. Technically, companies are required to recognize
the cost of compensation. Generally, that cost will be recognized as an expense, but in
some situations firms are required to capitalize compensation cost. See id. ¶ 5 & n.5.
For simplicity, we will assume the former and speak throughout of “expensing”
compensation cost.
10
Conceptually, the fair value of an option is the price that would be achieved in
an arm’s length exchange. See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ A7. However, while
vesting requirements would obviously affect the market value of an option, SFAS
123R instructs firms to calculate fair value ignoring vesting restrictions. See SFAS
123R, ¶ A9. Vesting is accounted for separately by recognizing compensation cost
only for options that ultimately vest. See id.
The following information is required to calculate option value: market price of
the stock as of the date of measurement, exercise price of the option, expected time to
exercise, estimated volatility, the risk-free rate of return, and the expected rate of
dividends. See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (8th
ed. 2006).
11
See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ 16-20, 39-49.
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out of the money,12 although between 1995 and 2005 firms that failed to
voluntarily expense options were required to provide pro forma earnings
statements in the footnotes to their financial reports that did include
option expense.13 Despite lingering questions about the suitability of
using existing option pricing models, which were designed to value
short-term tradable options, to value long-term, non-tradable employee
stock options, the FASB and most commentators agree that the current
accounting treatment for employee options represents a vast
improvement over the prior regime and is reasonably consistent with
accounting for cash compensation.14
Restricted Stock. The accounting treatment for restricted stock is
roughly consistent with that of cash compensation. The compensation
value of restricted stock as of the date of grant is expensed over the
vesting period of the stock.15
SARs. Stock appreciation rights (SARs) are economically equivalent
to stock options, but they are settled in cash, or in cash or stock at the
employee’s or employer’s option.16 Under SFAS 123R, cash-settled
SARs are treated as liabilities, rather than equity instruments. As such,
their realized value, rather than their expected value, is ultimately

12

See ACCT. PRINCIPLES BD., OPINION NO. 25, ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK ISSUED
EMPLOYEES (1972) [hereinafter APB 25]. Under APB 25, only the intrinsic value
of an option – the degree to which an option was in the money – at the date of grant
was recognized as an expense. There were exceptions, however. For example, an
option issued at the money with an exercise price indexed to the market or an at-themoney option that vested only if certain performance targets were achieved would have
resulted in an accounting expense. See FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., EXPOSURE DRAFT:
ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION ¶ 66-67 (June 30, 1993). SFAS
123R eliminated accounting-induced preferences for particular option designs.
13
FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO.
123 (1995) [hereinafter SFAS 123].
14
See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, Appendix B (discussing the bases for the FASB’s
decision to mandate fair value accounting for options); infra Part III.B.1.a (discussing
why option pricing models imperfectly value employee stock options).
15
See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ 21, 39-49.
For the uninitiated, restricted stock is stock that is provided to an employee at no
explicit cost or at a discount to the market price, but is nontransferable and forfeitable
up until a specified vesting date. See Judith E. Alden & Murray S. Akresh, Using
Equity to Compensate Executives, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 67, 82 (Yale D.
Tauber & Donald R. Levy eds., 2002). The amount expensed is the full value of stock
that is granted at no explicit charge to the employee or the discounted amount for any
bargain sales of stock to employees. Restricted stock granted to employees of public
companies generally involves no explicit charge to the employee. This will be our
assumption in the analysis that follows, although the analysis of bargain sales is
analogous.
16
See Alden & Akresh, supra note 15, at 98.
TO
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expensed.17 In brief, firms issuing SARs also utilize an option pricing
model to initially value the units, but they are required to update their
valuations and modify expense recognition between the dates of grant
and exercise. As a result of marking these units to market, the
cumulative amount expensed equals the amount realized by the
employee on exercise.18
2. Tax Treatment
The taxation of equity compensation arrangements begins with IRC
§ 83. That section provides the baseline rule that property received in
exchange for services is treated as ordinary income when the property is
received. Because of valuation and liquidity concerns, however,
recognition is often deferred for tax purposes until a realization event
occurs, such as the exercise of a stock option or the vesting of a
contractual right to sell one’s stock.
ISOs. The tax treatment of stock options depends on whether the
options qualify as incentive stock options (ISOs). A limited number of
ISOs can be granted each year to each employee.19 If holding period
and other requirements are met, the employee is not taxed until the stock
received on exercise of the ISO is disposed of, and the entire gain is
taxed at long term capital gains rates.20 In this case, the employer
receives no tax deduction.21
NQSOs. Although important in certain industries, such as the
technology sector, ISOs are estimated to account for only about 5% of
option grants.22 We will focus here instead on non-qualified stock
17

See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ 28-38. SAR treatment also applies to tandem
awards of stock options and SARs that provide the recipient with a choice of exercising
the option or the SAR, but not both. See id. ¶ A198-A200.
18
See infra Part III.C.1 for an example of SAR accounting.
19
The grant date fair market value of shares underlying ISOs that first become
exercisable by an employee in any year may not exceed $100,000. IRC § 422(d).
20
To qualify for ISO tax treatment, the shares may not be sold within one year of
option exercise or two years of the option grant. See IRC § 422(a). It is important to
note, however, that the spread on an ISO at exercise (the difference between the then
fair market value of the shares and the exercise price) is an adjustment for purposes of
computing alternative minimum tax. See IRC § 56(b)(3).
21
See IRC § 421(a)(2).
22
See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive
Compensation, 14 NBER/TAX POL’Y & ECON. 7 (2000). Not only are ISO grants
limited under the Code, at current tax rates they are generally not tax efficient for
profitable firms. From a global, i.e., employer plus employee, tax perspective, ISOs
are tax preferred only when the present value of the employee’s tax savings from ISO
treatment exceeds an employer’s NQSO deduction. At current top rates of 35% for
both corporate income and personal income, even a low 15% rate on long term capital
gains does not favor ISO qualification. See MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND
BUSINESS STRATEGY 229 (3d ed. 2005).
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options (NQSOs), which make up a much larger share of corporate
compensation. A recipient of a NQSO recognizes ordinary income
equal to the spread at exercise, i.e., the difference between the market
price of the stock at the time of exercise and the strike price of the
option.23 The employer is entitled to a deduction in an amount equal to
the income recognized by the employee.24 In other words, the tax
consequences to both the employee and the employer are based on the
realized value of the options.25
Restricted Stock. Absent a § 83(b) election, a recipient of restricted
stock granted at no explicit cost recognizes ordinary income in an
amount equal to the fair market value of the stock when it vests.26
Again, the employer is entitled to a deduction of the same amount at the
same time.27 If the employee makes a § 83(b) election, the employee
includes the fair market value of the stock as ordinary income at the date
of grant, without regard to any restrictions. The employer receives a
matching deduction.
SARs. The tax treatment of cash-settled SARs effectively mirrors
that of NQSOs. The cash received on exercise is recognized as ordinary
income, and the employer is entitled to a matching deduction.28
The tax advantage of equity compensation. Even when the matching
principle applies, the tax treatment of equity compensation is not
perfectly consistent with the taxation of cash or grant date taxation of
unrestricted stock grants. Because corporations are not taxed on
investments in their own equity, employers are able to hedge their equity
compensation obligations in such a way as to effectively exempt the
investment returns on NQSOs and restricted stock from taxation.

23

See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a).
See I.R.C. § 83(h).
25
This analysis assumes that option grants do not run afoul of recently enacted
IRC § 409A, which accelerates taxation and imposes penalties and interest on
employees participating in deferred compensation plans that do not meet certain
requirements. Options are generally subject to § 409A, but NQSOs granted at the
money are exempted. See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(A).
26
IRC § 83(a). Restricted stock is not subject to § 409A. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.409A-1(b)(6)(i).
27
IRC § 83(h).
28
See Rev. Rul. 80-300, 1980-2 C.B. 165 (holding that possession of SARs does
not produce constructive receipt and that the employee-recipient includes the amount
received on exercise in gross income in that year). From an employer’s perspective,
cash-settled SARs are considered deferred compensation. The timing of deduction is
thus controlled by IRC § 404(a)(5). SARs are exempted from § 409A on the same
basis as NQSOs. See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(A).
24
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However, the extent to which these arrangements are tax advantaged
(relative to cash compensation) is subject to debate.29
3. Disclosure
SEC regulations require detailed tabular disclosure in company
proxy statements of the compensation of the most senior corporate
executives. The executives for whom disclosure is required are usually
the CEO, CFO, and the three most highly compensated executives other
than the CEO and CFO (collectively, the “named executives”).30
Stock options and SARs received by these executives are reported in
a belt-and-suspenders fashion intended to give shareholders a complete
picture of executive compensation.
First, the amount of stock
option/SAR compensation recognized as an expense each year for each
executive is reported in the Summary Compensation Table, which is
meant to provide a bottom line compensation figure for each named
executive for each year.31 Thus, this table reflects the grant date value of
options prorated over the vesting period.32 Second, for the year of
issuance, the entire grant date value of an option/SAR is reported in a
table labeled Grants of Plan-Based Awards.33 Third, the number of
shares underlying outstanding options/SARs held by each named
executive, as well as exercise price and expiration data, are reported
29

For example, if a firm issues restricted stock to an employee in lieu of cash
compensation and uses the freed-up cash to repurchase its own shares, effectively
hedging the equity compensation, it will not be taxed on the investment in its own
equity per IRC § 1032. Moreover, the investment return is not taxed to the employee,
since the deferral of taxation on equity compensation is equivalent to exemption of
investment returns. As a result, the investment return goes wholly untaxed. That
exemption of investment return is advantageous if returns are positive, but
disadvantageous if returns are negative. However, depending on one’s assumptions
regarding the impact of limitations on the deductibility of capital losses, the symmetry
is broken and equity compensation can be significantly advantaged. See David I.
Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 695, 755-57
(2004) (synthesizing the employee and employer taxation of equity compensation);
Michael S. Knoll, The Tax-Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation, 103 TAX NOTES
203, 214 (2004) (finding that “over a range of circumstances” equity compensation is
tax advantaged); see also Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time
Value of Money,” 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986) (seminal article on time value issues and
taxation, including consideration of the tax efficiency of deferred compensation); but
see Ethan Yale, Investment Risk is Important When Assessing the Tax Benefit of
Deferred Compensation (working paper) (arguing in an analogous context that the tax
benefit of deferral should be viewed as only the avoided after-tax cost of financing the
resulting incremental investment).
30
SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(2)-(3).
31
SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c)(2)(vi).
32
The annual expense recognized for SARs is, of course, reported as well,
although SARs are not expensed in the same way as options. See supra Part II.A.1 and
infra Part II.C.1.
33
SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(d)(2)(viii).

11

annually in a separate table.34 Fourth, in the year of option/SAR
exercise, the number of shares acquired and/or value realized are
reported in still another table.35
Restricted stock grants to the named executives are disclosed in an
analogous fashion. Prorated portions of grant date values and full grant
date values are reported in the first two tables mentioned above.36 The
value of outstanding unvested shares is reported in a separate table, as is
the value of restricted stock realized on vesting.37
The SEC has endeavored to develop a compensation disclosure
regime that provides transparency and comparability. With respect to
traditional compensation – cash, stock, and options – it seems to have
largely achieved that objective.

B. Behavioral Effects

The patchwork of accounting, tax, and disclosure rules affect the
choices that managers make in how they pay themselves and their
employees. These rules affect the forms of compensation selected as
well as the reporting choices made by managers.
Tax. Firms and managers respond to tax incentives. This behavior
is unsurprising; taxes directly affect cash flows. Tax minimization can
be seen in a wide variety of business decisions, ranging from such
fundamental issues as choice of location, organizational structure, and
payout decisions, to more esoteric topics, such as the choice between
compensating employees with ISOs or NQSOs.38
Accounting. What’s more surprising, at least to academics, is the
degree of managerial sensitivity to reported earnings. Managers are
sensitive to reported earnings even in cases in which their choices only
superficially affect earnings, without affecting cash flows or the overall
information provided to the market.39 Given the general view of

34

SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(f)(2).
SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(g)(2).
36
SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c)&(d).
37
SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(f)&(g).
38
See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
39
See David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior, 64 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 927, 949-65 (2007) (surveying empirical evidence on the effect of
cosmetic accounting adjustments on corporate behavior).
35
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economists that the markets see through cosmetic attempts to boost
earnings,40 one might expect indifference to reported earnings as such.
But there are several reasons why managers care about reported
earnings for their own sake. First, the positive accounting literature has
shown that in some cases, reported earnings matter independently of
cash flow because debt obligations, covenants, and other contracts may
be tied to reported earnings. Given transaction costs, even cosmetic
changes in earnings can affect the value of these contracts and thus
shareholder value.41 Second, managers are particularly sensitive to one
type of contract tied to reported earnings – executive compensation
contracts. Earnings-based bonuses may be affected by even cosmetic
increases in reported income.42
Empirical data confirms managerial sensitivity to accounting rules
and practices. The evidence indicates that accounting choices vary
systematically between firms, that corporations make operational
changes in response to changes in accounting rules, and that firms
sacrifice cash flows to boost reported earnings.43
Disclosure. Assuming that there is some validity to the managerial
power view of the executive pay setting process, we would expect public
company executives to be particularly sensitive to the disclosure of their
compensation in company proxy statements. Under the managerial
power model, executive pay is constrained in part by the outrage it
produces among investors and the financial press.44 As a result,
obfuscation and camouflage assist executives in achieving high levels of
compensation, and enhanced transparency of disclosure is (for them)
counterproductive.45
40

See ROSS L. WATTS & JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY
72-73 (1986).
41
See id. at 133. The general idea is that in the presence of transaction costs, both
renegotiation of earnings-based contracts to adjust for cosmetic changes and failure to
do so can be costly.
42
See Walker, supra note 39, at 15-16, see also Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling
Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 877, 923-24
(2007) (arguing that IRC § 162(m), which disallows tax deductions for certain
executive pay in excess of $1 million per year that is not performance based,
encourages firms to adopt objective, formulaic bonus structures that can be
manipulated through cosmetic adjustments to earnings).
43
See Walker, supra note 39, Part II.
44
See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004);
Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002).
45
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 44; Bebchuk et al., supra note 44. Many
features of the current executive pay landscape appear to be more compatible with a
managerial power view of executive pay than with an optimal contracting approach
that views corporate boards bargaining at arms length with executives in a quest to
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Predicted Behavioral Effects. Although we observe behavioral
effects along each of these fronts, the degree of sensitivity varies
according to the circumstances. Managers of private companies are less
focused on accounting and compensation disclosure than public
company managers. Private companies do not file proxy statements
disclosing executive pay; nor are they generally required to file audited
financial statements. Because private companies often expect to go
public or be acquired by public companies in the future, they retain some
sensitivity to reported earnings, at least to the extent reflected in pro
forma income statements and balance sheets.
Still, when tax,
accounting, and disclosure motivations collide, private company
managers can be expected to focus more on tax and cash flow rather
than cosmetic accounting changes. By contrast, public company
managers are sensitive to each factor depending on the circumstances,
with variance both from firm to firm and over time. When executive
compensation for senior executives at public companies is at issue,
implicating both expense recognition and proxy disclosure, tax concerns
(and the resulting cash flow implications) often take a back seat.
Given these sensitivities, the tax, accounting, and disclosure
characteristics of various compensation devices affect their use. There is
both a first order distortion effect related to explicit differences in tax,
accounting, or disclosure characteristics and a second order distortion
effect related to susceptibility to manipulation.
1. First Order Distortion Effects
Tax, accounting, or disclosure rules that favor or disfavor a
particular form of compensation distort companies’ compensation
choices. Unless distortions are purposefully created in order to
overcome some market defect, these distortions should be expected to
result in inefficient compensation arrangements.
For example, prior to the promulgation of SFAS 123R, companies
could design stock options to result in no expense against earnings.46
Almost all options granted by public companies nominally satisfied
these requirements and thus were “free goods” from an accounting
perspective.47 This anomalous accounting treatment contributed to the
maximize shareholder value. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 44; Bebchuk et al.,
supra note 44.
46
See APB Opinion 25, supra note 12. Standard stock options that were granted at
the money or out of the money did not result in any compensation expense.
47
See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ B31. The “nominal” reference refers to the
practice of backdating stock options to effectively grant in-the-money options while
purportedly granting at-the-money options that did not have to be expensed. See
Victor Fleischer, Options Backdating, Tax Shelters, and Corporate Culture, 26 VA.
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explosion in stock option compensation in the 1990s. Empirical studies
of broad-based option plans have concluded that the favorable
accounting treatment of options drove their use,48 and anecdotal
evidence suggesting a link is plentiful.49 Recent evidence indicates that
SFAS 123R has resulted in a shift away from stock option
compensation.50
Similarly, differences in the tax treatment of incentive stock options
and non-qualified options affect the use of these instruments.
Depending on employer and employee tax rates, which have varied over
time and vary from firm to firm based on circumstances, one or the other
form of option will be tax advantaged once both employee and employer
tax treatment are considered. Empirical evidence shows that the use of
ISOs is related to this relative tax advantage.51
TAX REV. 1031 (2007); David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis
and Observations on the Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561 (2007).
48
See Steven R. Matsunaga, The Effects of Financial Reporting Costs on the Use
of Employee Stock Options, 70 ACCT. REV. 1, 23 (1995) (finding a positive relationship
between the use of options and other earnings management techniques and between
option use and dividend constraints in an analysis of option grants at 123 companies
over an eleven year period); Mary Ellen Carter et al., The Role of Incentives and
Accounting in the Design of Executive Compensation Packages 24 (AAA 2005 FARS
Meeting Paper, Aug. 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=590841 (concluding
as a result of a study of executive option grants reported in Standard & Poor’s
ExecuComp database “that what is driving the use of options in non-CEO
compensation is not the need to realign incentives, but the desire to avoid the
expense”).
49
See Walker, supra note 39, at 953-55 (reporting comments of Kevin Murphy
and other executive compensation specialists).
50
See Lawrence D. Brown & Yen-Jung Lee, The Impact of SFAS 123R on
Changes in Option-Based Compensation (Working Paper, May 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=930818 (finding a 28% reduction in the proportion of senior
executive pay comprised of options around the issuance of SFAS 123R and finding that
reductions in option use were consistent with pre-SFAS 123R use of options to manage
earnings).
51
See MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 231 (3d ed.
2002) (surveying evidence and concluding that on an aggregate level the use of ISOs
has varied consistently with the relative tax advantage).
Although companies generally respond as expected to tax rules that affect
compensation firm-wide, tax incentives directed at the executive suite do not always
have the desired effect. See, e.g., Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating
Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence Chief Executive Officer
Compensation, 20 J. LABOR ECON. S138 (2002) (concluding that IRC § 162(m) had
little impact on executive compensation); Steven Balsam & Qin J. Yin, Explaining
Firm Willingness to Forfeit Tax Deductions Under Internal Revenue Code § 162(m):
The Million Dollar Cap, 24 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 300, 321-23 (2005) (finding
forfeited tax deduction in 40% of firm-year observations and mixed evidence regarding
the efficiency of those forfeitures); Polsky, supra note 42, at 881 (concluding that
§ 162(m) has not effectively limited executive pay or improved executive incentive
alignment); Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time for Repeal? 21
VA. TAX REV. 125, 136, 139 (2001) (noting a trend away from executive pay contracts
capping golden parachutes to avoid losing corporate tax deductions and incurring
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Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that as equity compensation
disclosure requirements have been strengthened to increase transparency
and comparability, more compensation has been channeled into less
transparent modes, such as perks and supplemental retirement plans.52
2. Second Order Distortion Effects
Even if tax, accounting, and disclosure rules are non-distortionary if
fairly and honestly complied with, companies may prefer a particular
form of compensation if those neutral rules allow sufficient leeway to
generate favorable tax, accounting, or disclosure results. The option
pricing models currently employed for financial reporting and executive
compensation disclosure (and proposed for tax) provide considerable
scope for creative accounting. Each of the major inputs into these
models – stock price volatility, expected time to option exercise, and
even the stock’s anticipated dividend yield – is subjective and
manipulable. Professor Mark Rubinstein has estimated that a firm
seeking to overvalue options could reasonably select inputs and “report
values almost double those reported by an otherwise similar firm
seeking to undervalue its options.”53 Moreover, we have evidence that
firms have manipulated the inputs into their option pricing models in
such a way as to minimize the expense against earnings and the amount
of executive compensation disclosed in proxy statements.54 For some
companies, the ability to manipulate the valuation of options will be
valuable, and as a result they will tend to favor option compensation
relative to cash, restricted stock, and other compensation modes that do
not allow for such manipulation.55

excise taxes to contracts “grossing up” executives for excise taxes on excess
parachutes). Apparently, when it comes to their own compensation, executives are
more willing to overlook negative corporate tax implications.
52
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 44, at 95.
53
See Mark Rubinstein, On the Accounting Valuation of Employee Stock Options,
2 J. DERIVATIVES 8, 17 (Fall 1995). See also Maribeth Coller & Julia L. Higgs, Firm
Valuation and Accounting for Employee Stock Options, 53 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 26, 31
(1997) (concluding that the use of equally acceptable measurement techniques can
produce surprisingly large differences in option values). Note that the manipulability
of option pricing models is an issue separate from their accuracy in valuing long-dated
employee stock options. Critiques of the accuracy of these models are discussed in
Part III.B.1.a.
54
See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Reporting Choice and the 1992 Proxy Disclosure
Rules, 11 J. ACCT., AUDITING & FIN. 497 (1996) (finding evidence that managers
adopted option valuation methodologies that reduced footnoted compensation
disclosures prior to the advent of SFAS 123R). For more recent evidence, see the
sources referenced in Part III.A.2.
55
See Douglas A. Shackelford et al., A Unifying Model of How the Tax System and
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles Affect Corporate Behavior 30 (NBER
Working Paper 12873, Jan. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=958436
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C. Book/Tax Conformity as a Restraint on Gamesmanship

Advocates of enhanced book/tax conformity point to the growing
gap between the level of corporate income reported to investors (high)
and to the Treasury (low).56 Although much of the gap arises from
clearly identified book/tax differences, such as the treatment of stock
options and depreciation, a significant fraction is mysterious.57
Proponents argue that the lack of conformity provides firms with an
incentive, or at least an opportunity, to inflate earnings and/or understate
taxable income.58 For example, an entire class of tax shelters has been
developed that exploits the gap to reduce taxes without reducing, and in
some cases actually boosting, reported earnings.59
(arguing “that the attractiveness of a real decision depends on whether it expands the
discretion of both book and tax accounting”).
56
See Desai, supra note 4; Joann M. Weiner, Closing the Other Tax Gap: The
Book-Tax Income Gap, 115 TAX NOTES 849, 850-51 (2007) (summarizing data from
Charles Boynton et al., Distribution of Schedule M-1 Corporate Book-Tax Difference
Data 1990-2003 for Three Large-Size and Three Industry Groups, 111 TAX NOTES
177, 196 (2006), showing a general rise in the book-tax gap between 1990 and 2003).
57
See Desai, supra note 4, at 169-70 (finding that more than half of the difference
between book and taxable income for the largest US public companies for 1998
($154.4 billion) was not attributable to depreciation, options, or foreign source income,
the “traditional” sources of book/tax differences); cf., George A. Plesko, Corporate Tax
Avoidance and the Properties of Corporate Earnings, 57 NAT’L TAX J., 729, 733
(2004) (arguing that the Schedule M-1 book/tax reconciliation disclosure was so
inadequate that “it is only possible to speculate on the magnitude of specific factors
affecting the difference”). In 2004, the IRS adopted a new book/tax reconciliation
form, Schedule M-3, which should lead to an enhanced understanding of book/tax
differences. See Weiner, supra note 56.
58
See Desai, supra note 3; Yin, supra note 1; Whitaker, supra note 1; Shaviro,
supra note 2.
59
A nice example, suggested to us by Gregg Polsky, who we thank, was Enron’s
Project Condor. Entered into in 1999 and as described by the Joint Committee on
Taxation:
Project Condor was structured to generate approximately $930 million of
Federal income tax deductions without incurring any economic outlay. In
addition, because there was no corresponding financial statement expense, the
tax savings associated with these deductions were anticipated to generate
approximately $330 million after-tax financial statement income. Enron
intended to report the $330 million of financial statement income over the
anticipated 16-year life of the structure, whereas the $930 million of Federal
income tax deductions were not anticipated to be available to offset Enron’s
taxable income until beginning in 2015.
STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
OF ENRON CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND
COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 208 (Comm. Print 2003)
(footnotes omitted). See also, Desai, supra note 1 (describing efforts at Enron, Tyco,
and Xerox to boost earnings through aggressive tax structuring).
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The primary goals of book/tax conformity advocates are to reduce
artificial earnings inflation, which interferes with efficient capital
allocation, and to reduce tax sheltering, which burdens the public fisc.60
A related goal is to increase the transparency of both reporting systems.
Proponents generally envision using reported earnings as the baseline for
corporate taxation (as opposed to conforming book to tax). However,
few commentators argue for 100% conformity. Rather, proposals
typically call for adopting accounting income as a default for corporate
taxation, while permitting Congress to carve out deviations for tax
accounting, such as accelerated tax depreciation.61
Opponents of increased conformity point to the different purposes of
the two systems, which suggests that using a single set of rules for both
would be suboptimal. For example, while clear, consistent, and easily
administrable rules are needed to ensure fair distribution of the tax
burden, flexibility in GAAP may allow firms to communicate
information efficiently to investors.62
Equity compensation has become a primary focus of the book/tax
debate for two reasons. First, because the old accounting rules created
such a large gap between the book and tax treatment of options, options
accounted for a large portion of the overall book/tax gap.63 The other
reason is political: Although senior executives actually receive a small
fraction of equity compensation grants, the narrative of wealthy
executives manipulating the rules with respect to their own pay paints a
striking picture of executive greed.

60

Theoretically, the burden on the fisc could be offset with higher tax rates, and
our primary concern should be two resulting inefficiencies. First, the resources
expended by firms purely to shelter income from tax are wasted. Second, higher
marginal rates increase the deadweight losses from taxation, and in a non-linear
manner. See Alan J. Auerbach, The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation, in
1 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 74 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds.,
1985) (noting that the excess burden of a tax “increases with the square of the tax”).
61
See Yin, supra note 1; Desai, supra note 1; Engler, supra note 1; Whitaker,
supra, note 1; see also Shaviro, supra note 2 (proposing that taxable income of large
public corporations be adjusted by 50% of the positive difference between an adjusted
earnings figure and taxable income as otherwise determined).
62
See Ronald A. Dye & Robert E. Verrecchia, Discretion vs. Uniformity: Choices
Among GAAP, 70 ACCT. REV. 389, 390 (1995) (noting that accounting discretion may
enhance comparability by allowing individual firms to select the most appropriate
procedures under the circumstances). The flip side, of course, is that managers may
exercise the flexibility of GAAP to enhance perceived performance. See id. There are,
however, other concerns with increased book/tax conformity including increased
politicization of the financial accounting standard setting process, potential loss of
congressional control over tax policy, and increased instability in tax and accounting
rules. See Walker, supra note 39, at 976-78.
63
See Desai, supra note 4.
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Advocates of increased book/tax conformity for option
compensation suggest that the temptation to under-report option
accounting expense and over-report tax deductible expense may be
mitigated by requiring firms to utilize the same figures for both
purposes.64 If, as has been proposed,65 the tax deduction for options was
limited to the amount expensed, these two conflicting forces would
provide a check on over- or under-reporting.
Companies undoubtedly take advantage of the book/tax discontinuity
with respect to equity compensation to massage the books. But it’s
important not to overstate the opportunity for gamesmanship. Not all
compensation devices are equally manipulable. Of the most important
traditional compensation modes, the valuations of stock options and
SARs are singularly manipulable. Under current law, moreover,
manipulation is largely confined to expense recognition and disclosure,
even with respect to these instruments. Expense recognition and
executive compensation disclosure for options and SARs are based on
values derived from option pricing models with subjective inputs, 66
while taxation is based on realized gains. Salary and bonuses ultimately
are reported at realized value for tax and accounting purposes and are
disclosed accordingly. For public companies, there is little subjectivity
in assessing the value of restricted stock granted to employees. The fair
market value of unrestricted stock serves as the measure of value for
both book and tax purposes, and this value is transparent.
Moreover, as we argue below, the matching of employer and
employee taxation plays a disciplining role that is similar to proposed
book/tax conformity. Generally, firms are entitled to a deduction for
equity compensation in an amount equal to the income recognized by the
employee.67 The tension between these two forces also provides a check
on over- or under-reporting compensation.
If we include executive compensation disclosure, we actually have
four forces at play that influence the desired magnitude of reported
compensation. Generally, three of these four favor minimizing reported
compensation: expense recognition, executive compensation disclosure,
and employee income recognition. The employer-level tax deduction is
the only one of these factors influencing firms to inflate reported
compensation.
Of course, as suggested above, to the extent that accounting,
employer and employee taxation, and compensation disclosure are
64

See Desai, supra note 3; Levin statement, supra note 3.
S. 2116, 110th Cong. (2007).
66
See Murphy, supra note 54 and accompanying text.
67
See IRC § 83(h).
65

19

aligned, the balance struck by a firm that has the ability to manipulate
compensation will depend on firm-specific factors. Generally, however,
we can predict that public companies will tend to be relatively more
sensitive to accounting and compensation disclosure and private firms
less so.

III. HARMONIZING BOOK AND TAX

With that background, we are now in a position to assess the pros
and cons of conforming the book, tax, and disclosure rules for equity
compensation. We will compare the status quo regime with two
approaches to creating conformity: revising tax rules to mirror GAAP
and vice versa. Our primary focus in Sections A and B will be on
NQSOs and restricted stock. As we will see in Section C, the tax and
accounting treatment of SARs is already largely consistent.

A. Status Quo

As portrayed in the following table, under current rules, financial
accounting for restricted stock and options is based on expected value,
while employee and employer taxation are based on realized value.68
Current Law:
Measurement of NQSOs and Restricted Stock
Financial Accounting
Employer Tax
Employee Tax

Expected Value
Realized Value
Realized Value

1. NQSO Book/Tax Differences Absent Gamesmanship
Gaming potential aside, there is nothing inherently objectionable
about basing accounting expense on expected value and compensation
deductions on realized value. Of course, the realized gain on any given
option will almost always differ from the expected value calculated at
grant. But so long as the inputs to the option pricing model are fairly

68

Absent an election under § 83(b), taxation of restricted stock as compensation
occurs at vesting, regardless of when the stock is ultimately sold. Unlike the treatment
of options, the Code treats vesting as a realization event for restricted stock.
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estimated, there will be no bias one way or the other.69 In other words,
over time and in aggregate, the amount of NQSO expense reported to
investors in U.S. public companies should correspond with the
deductions reported to the IRS.
Nonetheless, in a recent Senate subcommittee hearing, Senator Levin
voiced concern regarding large differences in option expense reported to
the IRS and investors.70 He highlighted recent IRS data pointing to a
$43 billion difference between corporate tax deductions for options and
reported accounting expense for returns for tax periods ending in the
first half of 2005. However, as Levin noted, SFAS 123R was not in
effect at this point, so firms generally would have reported zero book
expense for options granted in this period.71
In order to get an idea of the differences in option valuation postSFAS 123R, the subcommittee asked nine companies to calculate what
the book expense would have been under the new accounting standard
for executive stock options exercised between 2002 and 2006. Levin
reported that the firms’ tax deductions for these options was 575% larger
than the corresponding “fair value” expense.72 However, this snapshot
does not give an accurate view of the relationship between book and tax
for three reasons.
First, by focusing on option exercise, the subcommittee introduced a
“survivorship bias” into the analysis. In order to glean meaningful data
from a longitudinal study of this nature, one would have to take into
account not just exercised options, but also options that expired
unexercised and options still outstanding.
Second, many of the options analyzed were granted in the mid-1990s
when stock prices were substantially lower than they were during the

69

To be sure, some commentators argue that option pricing models overstate the
market value of long-dated options because these models unrealistically assume perfect
liquidity. See infra notes 108-109 and accompanying text. The presence of a market
liquidity discount, however, does not suggest that a model is a biased estimator of
expected value. Other criticisms of the applicability of option pricing models to longdated options suggest only random errors. See infra Part III.B.1.a.
70
See Levin statement, supra note 3.
71
See id. The $43 billion figure comes from data reported on schedule M-3. This
schedule, which reconciles book and tax income, is required to be filed by public
companies with assets in excess of $10 million. For further discussion of the M-3 data
from this period, see Executive Stock Options: Should the IRS and Stockholders Be
Given Different Information?: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 110th
Cong. 72 (2007) (written testimony of Kevin Brown, Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue).
72
See Levin statement, supra note 3.
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early to mid-2000s, despite the market correction in 2001.73 Thus, a
substantial potion of the book/tax difference observed reflects the bull
market of the 1990s, not any inherent difference between the tax and
financial accounting valuation methods.
Third, notes to the analysis prepared by the subcommittee staff
explain that some of the options analyzed had been backdated.74 The
staff instructed participating firms to calculate pro forma SFAS 123R
expense under the assumption that these grants had not been backdated,
i.e., assuming the grants had been made at the money on the actual grant
date. But these pro forma expense calculations were then compared to
the actual tax deductions taken, although the lower backdated strike
prices would have inflated the executives’ realized gains and the
associated tax deductions. This apples versus oranges comparison
further contributed to the reported gap between the aggregate book and
tax figures.75 In sum, it is hard to draw conclusions regarding potential
biases between book and tax reporting for options from just a snapshot
of historical data, and the methodology employed by the subcommittee
staff simply does not provide a useful comparison.
Acting IRS Commissioner Kevin Brown speculated in his testimony
to the subcommittee that, in the wake of SFAS 123R, future Schedule
M-3 differences for options should be “temporary in nature.”76 This
means that while an option grant initially will result in expense
recognition without a tax deduction, ultimately a corresponding tax
deduction will be taken. For NQSOs, Brown’s statement should be
generally accurate over time and in the aggregate, reflecting the lack of
any bias between the expected values of options expensed under SFAS
123R and the realized values that determine employer tax deductions.
Of course, it will not be true on a firm-by-firm basis. Nonetheless, aside
from gaming potential, it is difficult to see the importance of ensuring
consistency between the accounting and tax expenses for options
reported by particular firms for particular periods.
73

See Executive Stock Options: Should the IRS and Stockholders Be Given
Different Information?: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of
the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 236-250
(2007) (revealing that at each participating firm some of the options analyzed were
granted in 1997 or before). Between 1994 and 1998, the Dow Jones Industrial Average
averaged about 6000 points. The average for the 2002 through 2006 period was about
10,000 points.
74
See id. at 247.
75
The appropriate comparison would have been between the actual tax deductions
taken and the Black-Scholes values of the in-the-money options granted. In other
words, the prevailing market prices on the actual dates of the grants and the lower,
backdated exercise prices should have been fed into the models. Of course, even if
backdating had been properly accounted for, the other two problems with the
methodology would remain.
76
Brown, supra note 71.
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2. NQSO Book/Tax Differences Due to Manipulation of Book
Value
The gaming potential, however, is a significant concern. The lack of
conformity between the book and tax treatment of options under current
law removes one potential check against under-reporting of stock option
expense and executive compensation by public companies. The severity
of the option expense under-reporting problem today is unknown.
Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that companies manipulated
the inputs into their option pricing models even prior to 2005, when
option expense was only footnoted.77 Today, of course, the stakes are
higher since option expense is now subtracted in arriving at the primary
reported earnings figure.78
As an example of the anecdotal evidence, the Wall Street Journal
reported in 2003 that several companies were abandoning past practice
of using five year average historical volatility data for their option
pricing models in favor of forward-looking volatility estimates.79 BlackScholes option value is particularly sensitive to the volatility
assumption, and this change had the effect of reducing reported option
expense, and increasing footnoted, pro forma earnings. However,
market volatility was indeed significantly lower in 2003 than it had been
in previous years,80 so perhaps the change was justified. On the other
hand, had there been a marked increase in market volatility in 2003, one
may question whether these firms would have substituted higher
estimated volatilities for historical volatility data.
This suspicion is reinforced by empirical evidence provided by
Bartov, Mohanram, and Nissim suggesting that firms opportunistically
exploited the discretion in SFAS 123 to select volatility measures that
would reduce reported compensation expense.81 They found that while
77

As noted above, although firms were not required to expense options prior to the
FASB’s revision of SFAS 123 in 2004, since 1995 firms that did not voluntarily
expense options were required to provide pro forma earnings statements in the
footnotes to their financial reports that did include option expense. See supra note 13
and accompanying text.
78
The potential for significant underreporting is apparent from theoretical work
suggesting that, without departing from reasonable assumptions, a firm wishing to
understate option expense could report values about one half those of an otherwise
similar firm wishing to overstate values. See Rubinstein, supra note 53, at 17.
79
See Gary McWilliams, Dell Joins Wave of Companies Seeking to Soften Options
Hit, Wall St. J., June 27, 2003, at C3. SFAS 123 suggested that firms should take both
historical and estimated volatility into account in calculating option values. See SFAS
123 supra note 13, ¶ 284-285.
80
See McWilliams, supra note 79, at C3.
81
See Eli Bartov et al., Stock Option Expense, Forward-Looking Information, and
Implied Volatilities of Traded Options (Working Paper, Apr. 2004), available at
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firms used both historical and implied volatility data in their models, the
weight assigned to implied volatility was significant only when implied
volatility was lower than historical volatility, in which case inclusion
reduced option expense.82
Other evidence of manipulation was reported by Hodder, Mayew,
McAnally, and Weaver in a 2004 study.83 The authors compared the
inputs firms used in calculating Black-Scholes values and concluded that
a subset of firms were using the discretion provided by the accounting
rules to reduce pro forma earnings.84
By contrast, in a study published in 2003, Balsam, Mozes, and
Newman found little evidence of manipulation of overall option
valuation. However, they did find significant evidence of manipulation
of the allocation of option expense over the vesting period to minimize
first year impact.85 The authors speculated that the difference might
have been attributable to greater transparency in the disclosure of the
inputs to valuation than in the inputs to the allocation decision.86
However, it is important to reiterate that the stakes are higher today
than they were when these studies were conducted. Researchers may
find even greater evidence of expense manipulation since SFAS 123R
has taken effect.87
http://ssrn.com/abstract=510042. SFAS 123 dictated the accounting treatment for
options between 1995 and 2005.
82
See id. at 3. Using the Black-Scholes model, firms with market traded options
can use actual trading information, including the prices of call and put options,
duration, etc., to back into the stock price volatility that is implied by this market data.
Obviously this data is not available for firms without market traded options.
83
See Leslie David Hodder et al., Using Valuation Model Inputs to Manage
Employee Stock Option Disclosures (Working Paper, Apr. 2004), available at
http://www.usc.edu/schools/business/FBE/FEA2004/FEApapers/AS6_MLMcANALLY.pdf.
84
See id., see also Murphy, supra note 54 (finding evidence that managers adopted
option valuation methodologies that reduced footnoted compensation disclosures prior
to the advent of SFAS 123R).
85
See Steven Balsam et al., Managing Pro Forma Stock Option Expense under
SFAS No. 123, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 31 (2003).
86
See id. Reporting companies were (and are) required to disclose in the footnotes
to their financial statements all of the inputs used to calculate option value – grant date
stock price, exercise price, volatility, expected life, the risk-free rate of return, and the
expected rate of dividends. With this information, a child (and most adults) could
calculate the “fair value” of an option using an online option pricing calculator, such as
the calculator found at http://www.option-price.com. Allocation of this value across
the service period also involves subjective inputs, such as the forfeiture rate of options
and the timing and amount of deferred tax benefits. These inputs were not required to
be disclosed. See id.
87
Option backdating entailed less subtle manipulation of the inputs into option
valuation models. Backdating firms misrepresented the grant dates of options and
hence the market price of the stock, which is a key input into option pricing models.
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3. NQSO Book/Tax Differences Due to Manipulation of Tax Value
It is unlikely that the lack of book/tax conformity results in
significant over-reporting of option expense for corporate tax purposes.
Matching the employee’s inclusion with the employer’s deduction
eliminates most of the net tax advantage of manipulation. Companies
with large tax losses might have an incentive to under-report option
gains to reduce employee-level taxes, while firms providing options to
employees whose marginal rates are less than 35% might have some
incentive to inflate the gain amount. But in cases in which employers
and employees pay tax at or near the 35% marginal rate, there would be
little or no net tax advantage to over- or under-reporting this
compensation.88 Second, and perhaps more importantly, because option
taxation currently is based on realized amounts, the opportunities to
manipulate the deduction amount are quite limited even without the
countering effect of inclusion and deduction.89
4. Restricted Stock: Book/Tax Differences
The current book and tax rules applied to restricted stock are
unlikely to generate significant book/tax differences. Recall that the
unrestricted value of stock at grant determines the book expense, while
the fair market value at vesting controls taxation in the absence of a
§ 83(b) election. Upward drift in stock prices suggests that tax valuation
may be slightly greater than book on average, but over the typical one to
four year vesting period of restricted stock, that difference is likely to be
trivial. More importantly, for firms with publicly traded stock,
manipulation opportunities are quite limited.90 Firms could minimize
Backdating certainly demonstrates a willingness to manipulate valuation. However,
although the effect of backdating was to reduce footnoted compensation expense and
executive compensation disclosures, see Walker, supra note 47, the extent to which
backdating was motivated by a desire to conceal compensation expense, versus
boosting option values for recipients, is unclear. See id.; Fleischer, supra note 47. Of
course, the revelation of backdating and SEC scrutiny could deter firms from
manipulating option values to enhance earnings.
88
The lack of a net tax advantage does not necessarily mean that firms will not
respond to an advantage at the employee or employer level at the cost of the other. We
think it less likely that firms would shift tax costs onto rank and file employees who
presumably are paid a market wage that would account for extraordinary taxes. On the
other hand, there is evidence of firms engaging in net inefficient tax behavior that
provides benefits to senior executives. See supra note 51.
89
Option exercise dates could be backdated to over- or under-state gains at
exercise. However, evidence of exercise date backdating has been limited to situations
in which backdating was used to under-state gains and reduce employee taxation. See
infra note 134 and accompanying text. No evidence has been uncovered of exercise
backdating to increase employer tax deductions.
90
Firms without publicly traded stock that follow GAAP could manipulate
compensation expense by underreporting the value of their stock.
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compensation expense by backdating stock grants to low value periods,
but doing so would likely have no affect on the value to recipients, so
unlike stock option backdating, the driving force would be slight.91
Moreover, absent a § 83(b) election, manipulation of tax valuation is
impossible because vesting occurs on a fixed date determined several
years in advance.92
5. Consistency Across Compensation Instruments
Under current law, both the tax and accounting treatment of various
compensation devices is relatively consistent. As discussed above, the
current system is not perfectly non-distortionary. In some situations, the
current combined employer and employee tax treatment creates a taxinduced preference for equity compensation over cash.93 In addition,
there is a troubling inconsistency in the accounting treatment of stock
options and economically equivalent stock appreciation rights, with
respect to which realized values ultimately determine compensation
expense.94 The members of the FASB apparently recognized this
situation, but decided that within the conceptual framework of GAAP,
maintaining the distinction between equity transactions (option issuance)
and assumption of liabilities (SAR grants) took precedence.95 However,
even though the difference between stock option and SAR accounting is
significant, any bias created is an order of magnitude smaller than the
bias inherent in the pre-SFAS 123R treatment of stock options.96 The
tax treatment of stock options and restricted stock and the accounting
treatment of these two popular compensation devices are consistent and
non-distortionary.

91

Backdating restricted stock grants would only be beneficial to recipients if they
made a § 83(b) election or if the number of shares granted was a function of share
price, i.e., if grants are based on value rather than a fixed number of shares.
92
There is a tax game for private firms, but it does not flow from lack of
conformity. Private firms can convert ordinary income into capital gains for their
employees by granting them restricted stock with low reported value. The employees
then make § 83(b) elections, paying tax at ordinary rates on the low reported value and
taking a correspondingly low basis in the shares. For the firm, the result is an
equivalent low tax deduction, but for many private firms, particularly start ups with tax
losses exceeding profits, this is a worthwhile tradeoff. See Ronald J. Gilson & David
M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for
Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874 (2003) (arguing that tax gaming
helps explain the issuance of convertible preferred stock, which can arguably justify a
much higher per share value than common, to private equity investors).
93
See supra Part I.A.2.
94
See supra Part I.A.1.
95
See SFAS 123R, supra note 6.
96
Recall that pre-SFAS 123R firms could issue options with zero earnings cost.
No other compensation device was free from an earnings perspective. The post-SFAS
123R treatment of options and SARs differs only in that the recognized expense
reflects the expected value of the former and the realized value of the latter.
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B. Conforming Tax to GAAP

Advocates of comprehensive book/tax conformity generally
propose modifying the tax rules to match GAAP.97 This is also the
approach put forward by those with specific proposals to conform the
book and tax treatment of options.98 The effect of conforming tax rules
to GAAP, as portrayed in the following table, would be to shift the
employer’s tax deduction for non-qualified options and restricted stock
from realized value to expected value.99

Employer Tax Conformed to GAAP:
Measurement of NQSOs and Restricted Stock
Financial Accounting
Employer Tax
Employee Tax

Expected Value
Expected Value
Expected or Realized Value?

Basing the employer’s tax deduction on the reported accounting
expense would reduce the incentive of firms to under-report option
values for accounting and disclosure purposes. But a difficult question
arises with respect to employee taxation. Would employees continue to
be taxed based on the realized value of options, thus driving a wedge
between employer and employee tax treatment? Would employees also
be taxed based on grant date expected values? Or would employees be
taxed on options at vesting, similar to the taxation of restricted stock?
Each possibility raises troubling issues; employee taxation may even be
the Achilles heel of these proposals to conform employer taxation of
equity compensation to GAAP.100

97

See Yin, supra note 1; Desai, supra note 1; Engler, supra note 1; Whitaker,
supra note 1.
98
See Desai, supra note 3; Levin statement, supra note 3; S. 2116, 110th Cong.
(2007) (proposing revision to IRC § 162 to provide that “the deduction … shall not
exceed the amount the taxpayer has treated as an expense with respect to stock options
… and shall be allowed in the same period that the accounting expense is recognized”).
As drafted, Levin’s bill would apply to NQSOs, but not to restricted stock or SARs.
99
Because SAR accounting is ultimately based on realized values, conforming
SAR taxation to GAAP would affect the timing, but not the amount of employer
deductions for SARs.
100
Senator Levin’s bill would not alter the taxation of employees. See S.2116,
110th Cong. (2007); Press Release, Carl Levin, Summary of Ending Corporate tax
Favors For Stock Options, S. 2116 Act, Sept. 28, 2007 (noting that the bill “[m]akes no
change to stock option compensation rules for individuals.”).
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1. Conforming Employee Taxation of Equity Compensation to
GAAP
Suppose a firm issues an option to an employee with grant date value
of $1 million and that the option vests in four years. Per SFAS 123R,
the company would recognize compensation expense of $250,000 for
each of the four years between grant and vesting.101 Existing conformity
proposals would allow the firm a $250,000 tax deduction for each of
these years. If the § 83 restriction were waived and employee taxation
conformed as well, the employee would have ordinary income of
$250,000 for each of these four years, and on the vesting date she would
hold an option with tax basis of $1 million.
At first glance, it might seem reasonable to tax employees on the
grant date value of equity instruments received and to assess the tax on
an accrual basis as the instruments vest. After all, despite the risk of
forfeiture, at the time of grant the employee has received a valuable right
and experiences a contingent increase in net worth. It is not clear
whether the employee has income in a Haig-Simons sense; while the
option is valuable, it cannot be transferred or exercised prior to vesting,
making it unclear whether the right is a property right in the HaigSimons framework.102 Moreover, the restrictions on transfer and
exercise make the valuation of the right subject to debate,
notwithstanding the evolution of sophisticated pricing tools. Still, there
is no doubt that the option recipient is better off than her otherwise
similarly situated colleague who receives no options.
However, there are numerous practical and conceptual problems
with conforming employee taxation of equity compensation to GAAP.
Part of the problem relates to the difficulty of achieving individual tax
equity in a world of ex ante stock and option tax valuation. The
potential for manipulation and avoidance creates a separate set of
challenges.
a. Valuation

101

This is not entirely accurate. Firms recognize compensation expense only for
equity instruments that vest. Thus, the book expense for the first year would be
reduced to reflect the firm’s estimated option forfeiture rate, and book expense in
subsequent years would be adjusted as that estimate is revised. See SFAS 123R, supra
note 6, ¶ 43. Forfeiture adjustments pose no difficulty for conforming employer tax to
book, but they are obviously problematic for achieving complete conformity between
book and employee tax. This point is discussed below.
102
See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938) (“Personal
income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised
in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between
the beginning and the end of the period in question”).

28

GAAP valuation of stock and options is a less than perfect measure
of the cost of employee compensation and perhaps an inappropriate
basis for taxing recipients. The objective of GAAP option valuation is
to estimate a firm’s opportunity cost in granting options – the price at
which it could sell identical instruments on the market.103 But the
methodologies used to value options were not designed for long-lived,
non-transferable, compensatory options, and their adequacy in this
service is highly contested.104 Critics of SFAS 123R point to several
inadequacies in the models. First, the models assume geometric
Brownian motion in individual stock prices, i.e., a random walk, and the
Black-Scholes model relies on an assumption of constant stock price
volatility.105 Critics argue that these assumptions are not borne out by
the data,106 and commentators have suggested that over the lives of
typical employee stock options these assumptions may lead to
significant valuation errors with respect to individual option grants.107
In addition, the option pricing models assume perfect liquidity,
instantaneous arbitrage, and negligible transaction costs.108 Critics point
out that liquidity in option markets diminishes with duration and argue
that, even if markets in long-dated options existed, they would reflect

103

Or nearly identical. As discussed supra note 101, firms are instructed to
estimate values ignoring vesting requirements. The effect of failure to vest is taken
into account at the recognition stage.
104
SFAS 123R does not specify a particular model for option valuation, listing the
Black-Scholes and binomial models as being among the techniques that can be used in
estimating fair value. See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ A13.
105
See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ A15.
106
Numerous studies have shown that U.S. stock prices do not follow random
walks. See, e.g., Ming Dong, Option Pricing with a Non-Zero Lower Bound on Stock
Price, 25 J. FUTURES MARKETS 775, 776 (2005) (citing studies, but proposing a
compensating adjustment to the Black-Scholes model). It is generally accepted that
stock price volatility will not remain constant over the life of a compensatory option.
See, e.g., Charles Baril et al., Valuing Employee Stock Options under SFAS 123R Using
the Black-Scholes-Merton and Lattice Model Approaches, 25 J. ACCT. EDU. 88, 95
(2007). Moreover, there is evidence that volatility is negatively correlated with stock
price. See Steve Swidler & J. David Diltz, Implied Volatilities and Transaction Costs,
27 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 437, 446 (1992). However, non-constant volatility can be
accommodated within binomial pricing models.
107
See Charles W. Calomiris, Expensing Employee Stock Options 38 (AEI
Working
Paper,
Aug.
5,
2005),
available
at
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.22873/pub_detail.asp (suggesting that valuation
errors may exceed 20% in 10% of the cases); Carol A. Marquardt, The Cost of
Employee Stock Option Grants: An Empirical Assessment, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 1191, 1214
(2002) (finding that while an adjusted Black-Scholes model provided reasonable
estimates of ex post option cost, on average, there was “significant variability in the
amount of model error on an option-by-option basis”).
108
See Peter Fortune, Anomalies in Option Pricing: The Black-Scholes Model
Revisited, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Mar./Apr. 1996, at 17, 23.
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significant liquidity discounts, which are not incorporated in the option
pricing models.109
Furthermore, GAAP valuation of employee options does not adjust
directly for the effect of non-transferability. Rather, SFAS 123R
instructs firms to adjust indirectly by incorporating assumptions
regarding early exercise into their models.110 For users of BlackScholes, this generally means plugging a point estimate of the expected
term to exercise into the model, which can lead to overvaluation.111 This
problem can be addressed, although not without added complexity, by
modifying the Black-Scholes approach or by using a binomial model
which provides the flexibility to incorporate a probability distribution for
option exercise.112
The FASB has recognized the imperfections in option pricing
models, but has concluded that valuation estimates derived from these
models are sufficiently reliable for recognition of option expense in
financial statements.113 The FASB points out, quite rightly, that “few
accrual-based accounting measurements can claim absolute
reliability.”114 However, it is one thing to conclude that models are
sufficiently reliable to determine aggregate option cost and aggregate
reductions to accounting earnings; it is another to conclude they are
reliable enough to form the basis of taxing individual optionees. Given
evidence of significant variability in pricing errors for particular option
grants, we remain skeptical.115
109

See Calomiris, supra note 107.
See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ A15.
111
At-the-money options generally exhibit a concave value profile over time such
that the value of an option exercised in six years would be greater than the average
value of options exercised in two years and in ten years. As a result, using a single
point estimate of term, instead of a distribution of potential exercise dates from vesting
to expiration, generally results in over-estimation of option value. See Thomas
Hemmer et al., Estimating the “Fair Value” of Employee Stock Options with Expected
Early Exercise, 8 ACCT. HORIZONS 23, 27-38 (1994); Phelim Boyle & William R.
Scott, Executive Stock Options and Concavity of the Option Price, 13 J. DERIVATIVES
72, 72-77 (2006).
112
Hemmer, Matsunaga, and Shevlin (HMS) have proposed an adjustment to
Black-Scholes to better account for early exercise. See Hemmer et al., supra note 111,
at 38-40. Other commentators advocate use of the binomial model to account for
option price concavity. See Boyle & Scott, supra note 111, at 73-74, 76 (noting that
the HMS adjustment becomes less accurate as more dispersed exercise distribution
functions are assumed and suggesting that the binomial method is more suitable); Brian
Maris et al., The Effect of Exercise Date Uncertainty on Employee Stock Option Value,
30 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 669, 693 (demonstrating value overstatement using BlackScholes and advocating use of the binomial model).
113
See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ B60.
114
Id.
115
We should note that option pricing models are used for transfer tax purposes
and in determining whether and to what extent an employee has received an excess
parachute payment under IRC §§ 280G and 4999. See Rev. Proc. 98-34 (valuation of
110
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The valuation issues with restricted stock are much simpler. The fair
value of restricted stock on the date of grant is simply the market value
of unrestricted stock.116 In this case, GAAP valuation clearly does not
reflect the diminution in value resulting from non-transferability prior to
vesting.
Note that we have not discussed the difference between the
opportunity cost to a firm of issuing stock or options and the typically
lower value to recipients, who generally are poorly diversified and
already face considerable firm-specific risk.117 GAAP does not consider
subjective employee valuation for earnings purposes, and there is no
reason to do so for tax purposes either.118 Of course, valuation discounts
arising from a risk of forfeiture would apply to both hypothetical third
party purchasers and employee recipients. Thus, even if GAAP stock
and option valuation was deemed sufficiently accurate to form the basis
of employee taxation, the risk of forfeiture would have to be accounted
for under a scheme taxing equity at grant.
b. Liquidity
Restrictions on the transfer, exercise and sale of equity compensation
instruments raise obvious liquidity concerns for employees taxed in
compensatory stock options for transfer tax purposes); Rev. Proc. 2003-68 (valuation
of options for the purposes of §§ 280G and 4999). However, in these cases, an
immediate, snapshot valuation is required. We do not have the option of waiting until
option exercise to value the instrument.
As discussed below, we also believe that limitations on the accuracy of the pricing
models applied to long-term options, in combination with a number of other factors,
suggest revising GAAP accounting for options to conform with that of SARs. See
infra Part III.C. However, we remain less concerned about inaccurate financial
statements than inaccurate employee tax valuations.
116
See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ 21.
117
See, e.g., Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay, 15 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 21, 26 (2003) (noting that inadequate diversification and vesting
and other restrictions on disposition create a wedge between the opportunity cost of
equity compensation to the issuing firm and the subjective valuation of the typical
recipient).
118
If employees value stock and options below their “cost,” they will demand
more of them, or more of some other type of compensation. This value gap is absorbed
by firms as the cost of providing performance and retention incentives. However, to be
administrable, the tax system must value compensation in the form of property at the
fair market value of that property.
Moreover, with respect to options, proper valuation takes into account premature
exercise motivated by employee risk aversion, which reduces the gap between firm
cost and employee value. This gap is not completely eliminated, however, because
employees are not free to exercise options at any time. They are prohibited from
exercising options prior to vesting. See Rubinstein, supra note 53, at 15 (arguing that a
differential between employer and employee value of options can only arise during the
period prior to vesting).
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complete conformity with GAAP. In the example above, if § 83 is
inapplicable, the employee receiving an option with grant date value of
$1 million would recognize up to $1 million of ordinary income before
she became entitled to exercise the option.119 The severity of the
liquidity problem would vary considerably. We might have little
sympathy for the large public company CEO who has considerable
accumulated wealth with which to pay the tax and who can probably
negotiate sufficient cash salary to pay the tax in any event. However, we
should be concerned about the stereotypical rank and file employee of
the cash-strapped Silicon Valley startup who has little accumulated
wealth and for whom equity represents a large fraction of compensation.
However, liquidity concerns could be alleviated by permitting recipients
to defer payment of the tax assessed on the grant date value of stock or
options until vesting or exercise. Accruing interest over the deferral
period would add a further complication, but the liquidity problem alone
is not insurmountable, at least for options that are eventually
exercised.120
c. Option Expiration Out of the Money
But what about the unlucky employee whose option expires out of
the money? Consider two employees – Lucky and Unlucky. Each
receives an option with grant date value of $100,000. Five years later,
Lucky’s pays off to the tune of $500,000. If taxed in conformity with
GAAP, Lucky would have $100,000 of ordinary income recognized over
the vesting period plus a $400,000 long term capital gain.121 Unlucky’s
option expires unexercised. Options that vest but expire unexercised are
still expensed under SFAS 123R and would generate a tax deduction for
the employer under conformity proposals. Accordingly, Unlucky would
also have $100,000 of ordinary income and a $100,000 capital loss.
Given current capital loss limitations, this result might seem harsh.122
Of course, Unlucky’s tax result is identical to that of an employee
who receives $100,000 cash compensation and purchases an option for
$100,000 that expires out of the money. If equity compensation
119

Typically, the last portion of income would be recognized in the year the option

vests.
120

The value of conformity as a check on manipulation lies in having the same
valuation serve multiple purposes. Nothing turns on the timing of payments.
Payments can be deferred, possibly at the taxpayer’s option, with interest assessed at
the market rate.
121
Lucky would have $100,000 basis in the instrument when that amount was
taken into income. Recall that our assumption in this section is that § 83 is repealed for
equity compensation permitting assessment of tax (and perhaps collection) for
unvested compensation.
122
Under current law, capital losses of individuals may be deducted against capital
gains and up to $3000 of ordinary income. See IRC § 1211(b).
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arrangements are just as voluntary, no relief is required. But if Congress
felt that relief was warranted because of imperfect information or
bargaining, it could allow the recipient an ordinary loss or waive the
capital loss limitation. But doing so might provide too much or too little
relief. First, from the perspective of Unlucky ex post, unless income
recognition was deferred until exercise (or expiration) without the
collection of interest, Unlucky would still bear a considerable tax cost
related to the ultimately worthless option.123 Moreover, given variations
in tax rates and/or Unlucky’s income, the value of the subsequent
deduction could be greater or less than the tax cost of the initial
inclusion.
Others might have little sympathy for Unlucky’s tax complaints if
Congress treats these losses as ordinary. After all, this approach is
perfectly consistent with the tax law’s treatment of interest forfeited as a
result of early withdrawal from a CD and similar forfeitures.124 These
critics might argue that allowing ordinary deductions is too generous ex
ante. The combination of capital gain treatment for appreciated equity
compensation and ordinary loss treatment of depreciated awards would
cause equity compensation to be significantly tax advantaged versus
123

Employee stock options typically expire ten years after grant. For options that
begin vesting after one year and expire unexercised, the employee would bear the tax
cost for up to nine years unless income inclusion was deferred until exercise/expiration
and interest on the deferred tax was ignored.
Although we have focused on the worst case scenario of options expiring out of
the money, the issue addressed in this paragraph would arise anytime the realized value
of a stock or option grant was less than its grant date value.
Note further that we have experience with a similar problem already. By offering
the prospect of further deferred taxation at lower capital gains rates, current tax law
encourages ISO recipients to hold the stock received on exercise for a year. See IRC
§ 422(a). However, for AMT purposes, the spread on the ISO at exercise is included in
income. See IRC § 56(b)(3). As a result, many individuals have been caught up in an
ISO trap, exercising options resulting in large paper gains and AMT and finding that
the value of their stock has declined precipitously prior to the date on which they could
sell and enjoy the capital gains rate preference. See Warren Rojas, Outdated AMT
Claims First Victims of the 21st Century, 91 TAX NOTES 691 (2001); Robert L.
Sommers, ISOs Meet the AMT: Employees Ambushed by the Tax Code, 91 TAX NOTES
2055 (2001).
While this result may seem unfair (and a number of bills have been introduced in
Congress to provide relief (see a list at www.reformamt.org)), generally the ISO
recipients could have sold their shares on exercise and paid tax at ordinary rates. In the
complete tax to book conformity world that is envisioned here, employee taxation
would be based on a value that could not be realized due to restrictions on transfer and
exercise. (Of course, the terms of NQSOs are subject to negotiation between the
parties. Vesting and transfer restrictions are not inherent in option compensation.)
Moreover, since NQSO use dominates that of ISOs, this problem would reach a much
larger population.
124
§ 1341, which addresses the tax consequences of an amount restored that had
been held under a claim of right, is an obvious exception to this rule. But while that
provision accounts for changes in marginal rates, it does not compensate taxpayers for
time value of money.
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cash compensation.125 To be sure, current taxation of equity may be tax
advantaged versus cash compensation in some cases.126 But grant date
taxation combined with ordinary loss treatment would be even more
clearly tax advantaged, and could lead employers to inefficiently favor
option compensation over other arrangements.
d. Forfeiture
Stock and option grants typically are forfeited if the employee’s
service is terminated prior to a predetermined vesting date.127 Under
SFAS 123R, companies reduce their aggregate accounting expense for
stock and option compensation to reflect expected and actual forfeiture
rates. Basing employer tax deductions for equity compensation on the
same aggregate figures is not problematic, but adjusting for forfeiture at
the employee level adds a further complication to full conformity.
There are at least two possibilities. First, forfeiture could be treated
in the same manner as the expiration of an unexercised option, i.e.,
producing a capital loss. Taxing equity recipients on an accrual basis
without explicit relief for awards that fail to vest might strike some as
particularly unfair because of the resemblance to an endowment tax.128
An unvested grant of equity compensation represents a heightened
ability to earn income in the future as the employee performs services
that turn her human capital into cash. Taxing prior to vesting – that is,
taxing the employee currently based on the performance of future
services – comes close to treating mere ability, rather than the actual
performance of services, as the basis of taxation, particularly if the
taxpayer is not made whole for taxes paid on awards that are forfeited.
Taxing such unrealized returns from human capital could be viewed as
infringing on the taxpayer’s autonomy by forcing her to continue
employment in a high-paying job just to pay the tax on services she has

125

The comparison is to a case in which the employee is paid in cash and invests
the after-tax amount in employer equity. In that case, all gains or losses would be
capital.
126
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
127
Traditionally, vesting of equity compensation was based solely on continued
service. In the late 1990s, responding to criticism that service-vested awards were
insufficiently linked to performance, many firms began issuing equity compensation
that vested based both on service and on objective performance criteria. See Carr
Bettis et al., Equity Grants with Performance-Based Vesting Conditions 7 (Working
Paper, Mar. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=972424 (finding in an
examination of proxy statements of 2,055 firms from 1995 to 2001, 475 utilized
performance-based vesting or payout conditions).
128
For a summary of the objections to endowment taxation, see Lawrence Zelenak,
Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145, 1156-62 (2006) (describing “talent slavery”
and other objections).
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not yet performed.129 To be sure, because entering into the employment
contract is a voluntary act, taxing the employee on the date of grant is
not as objectionable as the usual “enslaving the beachcomber” objection
to endowment taxation. Still, taxing employees today for services they
will perform in the future cuts against the grain of our realization-based
income tax system.
Alternatively, we might choose not to include in income the value of
stock or option grants that fail to vest as a result of service termination.
This could be accomplished by assessing employee tax based on grant
date values, deferring collection at least until stock or options vest, and
eliminating the tax obligation with respect to instruments that fail to vest
as a result of service termination. Another approach would be to reverse
the ordinary income that was recognized prior to forfeiture in the event
of service termination prior to vesting, perhaps with relief for time value
and adverse changes in marginal tax rates.130
If the failure of stock or options to vest is unrelated to the value of
the equity, canceling out the income seems reasonable. For accounting,
employer tax, and employee tax purposes, it would be as if the equity
compensation had not been granted. But, unless all equity compensation
losses were treated as ordinary, such a system would raise the specter of
opportunistic relinquishment of underwater equity instruments to avoid
capital loss treatment.131
e. Manipulation Potential
Accuracy issues aside, ex ante stock option valuation, which requires
firm-specific assumptions regarding stock price volatility, expected time
129

To be sure, employment is voluntary and compensation arrangements are
negotiable at some level. Thus, the “wage-slave” analogy is not as persuasive in this
case as it might be with respect to proposals, for example, to tax law professors on the
salaries they could earn in private practice.
130
Providing relief for adverse changes in marginal tax rates would be consistent
with the treatment in IRC § 1341 of amounts restored that had been held under a claim
of right. See supra note 124. An approach that provided relief for time value of money
in addition to adverse changes in marginal rates could be thought of as “§ 1341 plus.”
131
It would not be a good idea, for example, to treat all forfeitures as a result of
employment termination as ordinary losses and all other relinquishments/out-of-themoney expirations as capital losses, as this approach might distort employment
decisions at the margin. Suppose tax was to be collected at vesting based on the $1
million grant date value of an option granted to a CEO. Suppose that several months
prior to vesting the option is far out of the money and worth only $100,000. Assume
that if the option vests the CEO incurs tax of $350,000 (at 35%) on property worth far
less. If the CEO departs, no tax will be assessed with respect to the option. Of course,
the employer’s tax position would be reversed. If employment is terminated prior to
vesting, the expense and tax deduction are reversed. However, the value of the tax
deduction will not necessarily offset the cost of the employee’s tax obligation, and thus
a negotiated solution is not inevitable. In some cases, employment could be affected.
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to exercise, and dividend policy, is highly manipulable.132 Option
valuation at exercise is not. Simply put, why would we want to increase
the importance of the more manipulable valuation method by using it to
assess employee tax as well as employer option expense and employer
tax deductions?133
In a regime in which both employee and employer tax were based on
ex ante option valuation, executives would generally have two
incentives to minimize those values – increasing reported earnings and
minimizing the personal taxes of themselves and their employees. To be
sure, employer deductibility provides a counter incentive. However, it
would not be surprising to discover that executives often would find the
final consideration – deductibility for the firm – to be the least important
of the three.
The recent option backdating scandal provides a cautionary tale.
Evidence of backdated option grants suggests a widespread willingness
to bend the rules when the compensation of executives and subordinates
is at stake. Evidence of backdated option exercise indicates a
willingness to sacrifice corporate tax deductions for personal tax
savings.134 Moreover, like backdating, manipulation of ex ante option
valuation would be difficult to detect.
132

See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
Professors Ethan Yale and Gregg Polsky have similarly concluded that “the
malleability of the accounting valuation rules [for NQSOs] make them a poor guide for
assessing taxes.” See Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of
Deferred Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 571, 590-91 (2007). As noted above,
restricted stock valuation is much less manipulable than option valuation. Thus, this
concern applies almost exclusively to options.
134
See Eric Dash, Dodging Taxes Is a New Wrinkle in the Stock Options Game,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at C1 (reporting allegations of exercise backdating at
Symbol Technologies and Mercury Interactive); Jennifer Levitz, Comverse Ex-CEO
May Have Fudged Option Exercise Dates, Not Just Grants, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2006,
at C1 (reporting suspicious exercise timing at Comverse). Backdating option exercise
to a low stock price date effectively converts a portion of what would be ordinary
income for the employee into capital gain. This conversion would reduce the
employee’s income tax bill as well as the employment taxes paid by both parties.
However, the firm loses an income tax deduction for the portion converted. See
Walker, supra note 47, at 618 n.219. Unless the issuing firm faced a very low
marginal tax rate, this tradeoff is unlikely to be net tax efficient. The tradeoff, in fact,
is similar to the choice between granting ISOs and NQSOs. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
Of course, there are many other examples of firms inefficiently sacrificing
corporate tax deductions. For instance, firms routinely forfeit tax deductions for
executive pay by failing to utilize compensation structures that satisfy § 162(m), e.g.,
by paying executives salaries in excess of $1 million per year. See supra note 51 for
further discussion of that and similar examples. It is also well established that firms
sacrifice corporate tax benefits to improve financial accounting results. See Douglas A.
Shackelford & Terry Shevlin, Empirical Tax Research in Accounting, 31 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 321, 327 (2001).
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Of course, the incentives of executives to manipulate option values
will vary depending on their sensitivity to earnings, corporate tax, and
personal tax issues. We will have more to say about this in subpart 2
below. Our point here is simply that scope for manipulation, whatever
the desired direction, is greater with respect to ex ante than ex post
valuation.
f. Avoidance and/or Distortions
Yet another problem with book/tax conformity based on grant date
values for stock and options is that the regime is, in effect, voluntary and
elective. Without extensive adjustments elsewhere, companies could
choose between grant date book/tax conformity and other regimes that
generate economically similar results with better regulatory treatment,
depending on their strategic preferences.
First, consider SARs, which are cash awards that mimic stock option
contracts and are economically equivalent to options. Under GAAP,
SARs are considered liabilities rather than equity and are accounted for
on a mark to market basis.135
Under comprehensive book/tax
conformity, SAR taxation (let us assume both employer and employee
taxation) would be marked to market as well. SAR recipients would still
face liquidity issues, but assuming that gains and losses were treated as
ordinary, firms and employees could avoid many of the harshest aspects
of grant date tax valuation of options by switching to SARs.
Of course, SAR accounting could be revised to be consistent with
option accounting. But if it was, that would just shift the inevitable linedrawing problem between incentive arrangements treated as equity
compensation and arrangements treated as cash compensation. For
example, how would we treat cash bonus plans tied to reported earnings
rather than increases in stock prices? Would participants be taxed based
on an ex ante estimated value as well? Surely at some point, firms
would be able to structure incentive programs that result in ex post
taxation of employees, even if such programs were not ideal from the
point of view of aligning the employee’s incentives with shareholders.
Managers might be willing to swallow a small increase in agency costs
in order to avoid grant-date taxation.136
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See infra Part III.C.1 for a detailed example of mark to market accounting
applied to SARs.
136
In their recent analysis of the taxation of deferred compensation, Professors
Yale and Polsky question whether reform of deferred compensation taxation is
worthwhile if all inconsistencies in the taxation of cash, deferred, and equity
compensation cannot be eliminated. See Yale & Polsky, supra note 133, at 589-92.
Our inquiry here is similar.
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Let us suppose, however, that a program of grant date taxation of
stock, options, and their close substitutes could somehow be made to be
“sticky.” If the participants remain dissatisfied, they will simply
substitute old fashioned cash bonuses. This shift might or might not be
efficient. (Although the shift looks like a tax-induced distortion in pay
practices, we cannot be sure that the status quo baseline is nondistortionary.) However, depending on how relief for liquidity, loss
limitations, and forfeiture were handled, the new regime very well could
induce an inefficient distortion in corporate pay.
The electivity of grant date book/tax conformity is highlighted by the
critical design question of whether to apply the regime to privately-held
companies. Professor Shaviro’s proposal, for example, would apply
only to public companies.137 As a result, companies that believed that
book-tax conformity would reduce tax deductions and increase their cost
of compensation might choose to go private, or remain private, in greater
numbers. Book/tax conformity would thus exacerbate the penalty of
increased tax and auditing costs associated with going public.
Of course, given the manipulability of ex ante option valuation, it’s
possible that some firms might be more attracted to options in a world of
complete ex ante conformity. The opportunity to game valuation for one
purpose or another would provide a planning option for firms utilizing
option compensation and represent a distortion in the other direction.138
Senator Levin’s proposal, without explanation, apparently applies to
all companies, public or private, which obviously raises other
gamesmanship concerns.139 Because many privately-held companies
need not comply with GAAP, they would have considerable flexibility
in valuing options so as to maximize the tax deduction (and reduce the
less important reported earnings). By retaining current rules for
employee taxation, the Levin proposal invites massive gamesmanship by
privately-held firms. We expand on this issue below.
2. De-Linking Employer and Employee Taxation
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See Shaviro, supra note 2, at 60-61.
Under current rules, stock options provide firms with an opportunity to
minimize compensation expense and executive compensation disclosure. If employer
and employee tax were conformed with book, firms would also have the opportunity to
minimize employee tax or potentially maximize employer tax deductions. As
suggested above, one would expect discretion to be used to minimize the reported
value of options under this regime, but situations might arise in which corporate tax
concerns dominate other considerations.
139
See S. 2116, 110th Cong. § (q)(1) (2007) (limiting deduction to the amount taxpayer
has treated as an expense “in a report or statement to shareholders, partners, or other
proprietors (or to beneficiaries),” without limitation to publicly-traded entities).
138
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If conforming employee taxation of equity compensation to book is
unattractive, then proposals (like the Levin proposal) conforming
employer taxation to book must give up the matching principle which
limits and links an employer’s tax deductions to the amounts included by
the employee. De-linking employer and employee taxation of equity
compensation raises a particularly thorny set of issues.
Severing the link between employer and employee taxation of equity
compensation is not inherently objectionable. As Professor Halperin has
explained, matching the timing of employer and employee taxation is
not necessary to achieve correct and consistent taxation.140 Consider
deferred compensation that is earned in an initial year and paid out in a
subsequent year. Halperin demonstrates that deduction and inclusion in
the initial year, deduction and inclusion in the subsequent year, and
deduction in the initial year and inclusion in the subsequent year all
produce the same tax result so long as the investment return on the
deferred compensation is taxed at the same rate. This equivalence holds
for equity compensation as well, even though the returns are much less
certain.141
Importantly, however, giving up the matching principle would create
new gaming opportunities for companies compensating employees with
options. There are at least two possibilities. First, we could simply
retain the current tax rules for optionees, while conforming employer
taxation to book. Under this approach, employee taxation of options
would continue to be based on realized gains. An employer’s tax
deduction for options, however, would be based on expected values
derived from an option pricing model. Thus, firms could adopt
assumptions regarding expected time to exercise, stock price volatility,
and anticipated dividend yields that inflate calculated grant date values
and corporate tax deductions without impacting the amount of income
included by their employees.142
To be sure, inflating grant date valuation to boost corporate tax
deductions would also result in increased compensation expense for
financial reporting purposes and increased executive compensation
reported in proxy statements. For some firms, these counterweights
would limit or preclude inflation of the tax deduction. But privatelyheld firms, of course, could easily be tempted to trade increased cash
140

See Halperin, supra note 29, at 520.
See Walker, supra note 29.
142
See Rubinstein, supra note 53 (estimating that a firm wishing to over-state
option values could reasonably select assumptions yielding expected values almost
twice those of a firm wishing to undervalue options). To be sure, employer and
employee taxation of qualified plans is also de-linked, but in this case the employer
contribution is in cash which presents no valuation or manipulation issue. Option
valuation is uniquely manipulable.
141
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flow for a decrease in reported earnings presented to their private
investors with a wink and a nod.
Even if conformity is limited to public firms, the gamesmanship
issue remains. Reported earnings may be of limited usefulness in
constraining gamesmanship among quasi-public companies (such as
those that trade on closed exchanges for institutional investors) or those
companies that voluntarily follow GAAP (or International Accounting
Standards) and therefore might fall within the scope of book/tax
conformity.
Moreover, not every traditional public company is a slave to reported
earnings. After-tax cash flows also matter to managers, and it is not
self-evident that reported earnings and compensation disclosure are
better restraints on gamesmanship than employee-level taxes. In any
event, firms with a strong focus on cash flow and limited sensitivity to
reported earnings and compensation disclosure would be tempted to
exploit the tax gap and select option valuation assumptions that produce
outsized tax deductions.143
A second possibility would be to conform employee taxation of
options to book (and employer tax) to the extent possible without
violating the principle of § 83. This would mean taxing options at
vesting. If implemented consistently with the taxation of restricted
stock, options would be revalued at vesting using one of the option
pricing models, since the option spread at vesting would not fully reflect
the option’s value at that point.144 Although this approach would
overcome the employee liquidity and forfeiture concerns, its weaknesses
should be readily apparent. Option valuation for employer and
employee tax purposes would remain de-linked, allowing firms to select
grant date model inputs that increase option costs and employer tax
deductions. In addition, unlike the current employee taxation of options,
revaluation at vesting would allow firms to select vesting date
assumptions that decrease option values and employee tax inclusions.
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We can only speculate as to how severe this problem might be, as there is no
precedent of de-linking employee and employer taxation of options. But consider, for
example, a public company that is already planning to take a major hit to reported
earnings from a one-time event, such as a restructuring. The company may wish to
issue stock options to employees that year using a high volatility estimate and thus a
high valuation of the options, increasing the firm’s tax deduction. This one-time hit to
corporate reported earnings is offset by the benefit of increased cash flow from lower
taxes. Because the employees would not pay tax until realization, they would have no
reason to object to the high estimated initial value of the options.
144
See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 10.
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Meanwhile, this approach remains susceptible to criticisms regarding the
(in)applicability of option pricing models to employee options.145
In sum, severing the link between employer and employee taxation
of equity compensation raises severe policy concerns. For companies
that are indifferent to reported earnings, the gamesmanship opportunities
would be plentiful.

C. Conforming GAAP to Tax

Book/tax conformity proponents generally take GAAP as a given
and assume that conformity would require modification of tax rules to
mirror GAAP.
That is probably a reasonable assumption for
comprehensive book/tax conformity proposals.
However, in the
particular case of equity compensation, it is conceivable that GAAP
could be conformed to mirror the tax rules. The model exists in the
GAAP rules applicable to cash-settled SARs. Applying these rules to
stock options, and possibly to restricted stock, could produce conformity
of tax, accounting, and compensation disclosure, all at the realized value
end of the spectrum.
GAAP Conformed to Tax:
Measurement of NQSOs
(and Perhaps Restricted Stock)
Financial Accounting
Employer Tax
Employee Tax

Realized Value
Realized Value
Realized Value

1. Example of the SAR Expensing Method Applied to Options
Under SFAS 123R, the expense associated with SARs is initially
calculated using an option pricing model and grant date information on
the stock price, volatility, etc. However, the ultimate measurement date
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Several improvements could be made to this bare bones approach. For
example, the spread of an option at vesting could serve as a lower bound on the
permitted valuation for employee taxation. The value of an option with remaining life
always exceeds the current spread, but for options well in the money, the difference
between option value and spread may be slight. See id. Another possibility would be
to dispense with revaluation at vesting and tax employee recipients based on the grant
date valuation. That approach, however, is the same as full conformity with relief from
tax until vesting.
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for SAR expense is the exercise date. In the interim, SAR expense is
recalculated at the end of each reporting period.146
Let’s compare expense reporting for options and SARs to highlight
the difference. First, assume a firm issues an NQSO to an executive on
January 1, 2008 with grant date Black-Scholes value of $3 million, and
assume that the option vests over three years. If the option does indeed
vest, the expense recognized for that option would be $1 million per year
for each of the three years between grant and vesting.
However, if the instrument granted is an economically equivalent
SAR instead of an NQSO, the value would be recalculated periodically
and the book expense adjusted accordingly. Suppose that at the end of
2008, the Black-Scholes value of the SAR based on the then current
stock price, volatility, and remaining life is $4.5 million. The expense
recognized for 2008 would be $1.5 million (1/3 of $4.5 million) instead
of $1 million. Suppose that at the end of 2009, the recalculated value is
$6 million. Because service has been provided for two years, the
cumulative expense that must be recognized is $4 million. Thus, the
expense recognized for 2009 would be $2.5 million ($4 million less the
$1.5 million expense recognized in 2008). Suppose at the end of 2010
when the SAR vests, the recalculated value is $5 million. The expense
recognized for 2010 would be $1 million in order to produce a
cumulative expense of $5 million.147
However, marking SAR expense to market does not end with
vesting. It continues until the instrument is exercised.148 Suppose at the
end of 2011 the SAR remains unexercised and has a calculated value of
$6.5 million. The issuer would recognize compensation expense of $1.5
million for 2011. Finally, suppose the SAR is exercised in 2012 and
results in a payment to the recipient of $7 million. $500,000 of
compensation expense would be recognized in 2011, bringing the
cumulative recognized compensation expense in line with the realized
value of the instrument.
Marking stock options to market in the same fashion would produce
eventual conformity between book and tax. Assuming that the SEC
continued to base its executive compensation disclosure rules on
expense recognition under GAAP, all four measures of compensation
would eventually conform. Recall that under current proxy disclosure
rules, the summary executive compensation disclosure table includes as
option compensation each year the amount expensed per GAAP.149
146

See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ 36.
See id. ¶ A127-A133 for a similar example.
148
See id. ¶ 36.
149
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
147
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Thus, for our executive, the disclosed option compensation would be as
follows: 2008, $1.5 million; 2009, $2.5 million; 2010, $1 million; 2011,
$1.5 million; 2012, $0.5 million. Of course, the value of option
compensation reported in the table detailing grants of equity awards
would continue to be $3 million. SAR and option treatment are identical
in that regard, as they must be.
2. Pros and Cons of Conforming Book to Tax
The prospect of a final day of reconciliation between the tax and
financial accounting books should dampen enthusiasm for underreporting option expense at grant, but it is possible that this method of
conforming the books would do less to dissuade firms from gaming
earnings than the alternative of conforming tax to GAAP. Under an
expected value approach, firms that care about tax face a stark tradeoff
at grant between minimizing taxes and maximizing reported earnings.
Under a realized value approach, the tradeoff is postponed, and one can
imagine firms shading initial and interim option expense down, all the
while realizing that the expense recognized and compensation revealed
in the year of exercise will be commensurately larger.150
On the other hand, the two approaches to conformity both achieve a
primary goal of reformers, which is to ensure that corporate tax
deductions do not exceed the amount reported to investors.151
Moreover, conforming book to tax would leave the current tax rules in
place, and doing so has several advantages over conformity at book.
First, as we have discussed above, the linkage between employer and
employee tax valuation, particularly when both are based on realized
value, helps combat valuation gaming with respect to tax. Second, this
approach eliminates any possible private company/public company
distinction and distortion relating to the tax rules for equity
compensation. Third, this approach provides the added bonus of
eliminating the inconsistency between the accounting treatment of
economically equivalent options and SARs.
What are the downsides to conforming book to tax? Some firms
might object to basing ultimate stock option expense on realized values
rather than expected values from a salience perspective. The concern
would be that investors will ignore all the options that expire out of the
money, but will be outraged by the few options that are exercised for
150

For example, suppose the firm in our hypothetical manipulates the inputs into
the Black-Scholes model to produce an initial option value of $2.5 million instead of
$3 million. The firm might continue to use assumptions that reduce accruals between
2008 and 2011. However, when the instrument is exercised in 2012, the firm would be
forced to recognize the difference between the $7 million realized value and the
cumulative amount recognized as an expense up to that point.
151
See Levin statement, supra note 3.
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huge gains, thus unreasonably penalizing the most successful firms and
executives.152 It is not clear, however, that this would be a serious
drawback to conforming book to tax. Under current GAAP rules, total
gains on executive option exercises are clearly disclosed in a separate
table.153 Presumably, that table would remain unchanged if book were
conformed to tax. Of course, that table only discloses compensation for
the top five executives. Total compensation expense subtracted from
reported earnings would include all annual gains or losses on options.
But, again, under a mark to market approach, the total realized values of
options would not be subtracted from earnings as a lump sum. The
amount would be subtracted on an accrual basis. One would think that
from a salience perspective, marking to market would tend to reduce the
kind of huge, lumpy compensation expense that is most likely to
produce outrage.
A second potential problem lies in implementation. The FASB has
only recently addressed this issue, and it concluded that grant date
measurement of option compensation is preferable to measurement at
exercise, the approach utilized with SARs.154 Convincing the FASB to
reverse its position on this point would be difficult.
However, reversal is conceivable for several reasons. First, it is
clear from the statements of the FASB over the last fifteen years that the
group’s primary concern in this area is that option compensation be
expensed.155 With respect to details – grant or settlement date
measurement – the strength of conviction is less obvious. The academic
community appears to be split on the option measurement question,156
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See Polsky, supra note 42, at 909 (arguing that “public uproar over options
inevitably occurs upon exercise rather than upon grant”).
153
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
154
See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ B43-B48. This view is shared by the
International Accounting Standards Board. See id. ¶ B48 (noting consistency with
international accounting standards); INT’L ACCT. STD. BD., TECHNICAL SUMMARY,
IFRS 2: SHARE-BASED PAYMENT 1 (2008) (noting that the “fair value of equity
instruments granted [to employees] is measured at grant date”).
155
See generally FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., EXPOSURE DRAFT: ACCOUNTING FOR
STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION (1993); SFAS 123, supra note 13; SFAS 123R, supra
note 6.
156
Although the FASB ultimately adopted grant date measurement in SFAS 123R,
numerous commentators advocated exercise date measurement based on the liabilitylike character of equity compensation, the lack of a practical difference between
options and cash-settled SARS, and the mitigating effect of exercise date valuation on
the problems inherent in applying option pricing models to employee options. See
SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ B43-45. See also, AM. ACCT. ASS’N FIN. ACCT. STD.
COMM., RESPONSE TO IASB EXPOSURE DRAFT, “SHARE-BASED PAYMENT,” (2003)
(arguing in favor of exercise date measurement of stock option expense); Steven
Balsam, Extending the Method of Accounting for Stock Appreciation Rights to
Employee Stock Options, 8 ACCT. HORIZONS 52 (1994) (same); Michael Kirschenheiter
et al., Accounting for Employee Stock Options, 18 Acct. Horizons 135 (2004) (same);
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and there are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches.
Conceptually, one might favor grant date measurement under the view
that the tradeoff is made at that point between cash and option
compensation and that the cash equivalent should constitute the measure
of the expense.157 On the other hand, as the FASB notes in SFAS 123R,
settlement date measurement would mitigate concerns regarding the
accuracy of option pricing models and is the usual accounting response
to uncertainty.158 Further, although neutrality is an expressed objective
within the FASB’s conceptual framework,159 SFAS 123R does not
adequately address the discrepancy between the treatment of
economically equivalent options and SARs. Instead it relies on the
conclusion that SARs represent liabilities, while options are equity
instruments, a distinction of absolutely no moment to firms and their
employees and seemingly the weakest possible basis for line drawing.
To be sure, this inconsistency could be resolved in either direction and
SARs are granted much less frequently than options, so, in isolation, this
is not an overwhelming argument for revising the measurement date for
option compensation.160
There is, however, an additional argument for switching to the SAR
approach that is not expressly addressed in SFAS 123R, and that is the
susceptibility of option pricing models to manipulation. The FASB
recognized that the mark-to-market approach utilized in accounting for
SARs would mitigate concerns about the applicability of option pricing
models developed for traded options to compensatory options, but they
appeared to view this as simply an accuracy of measurement issue.161
Manipulation is another question. It is conceivable that if the FASB
Gerald J. Lobo & Joseph C. Rue, Accounting for Stock Options: Comparison of
Alternative Approaches, 16 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 27, 36 (2000) (same); Ara Volkan,
The FASB Should Revisit Stock Options, 2 J. AM. ACAD. BUS. 254 (same).
157
See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ B46. By this view, SAR accounting conflates
compensation expense (grant date value) with a firm’s bet on its own stock price (the
mark to market requirement).
158
See id. ¶ B45.
159
See FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., FACTS ABOUT FASB 2 (2007), available at
www.FASB.org (providing FASB mission statement which states as a precept that the
FASB will “ensure, insofar as possible, the neutrality of information resulting from its
standards” and notes FASB’s belief that the “public interest is best served by
developing neutral standards that result in accounting for similar transactions and
circumstances in a like manner”).
160
It remains to be seen, however, whether rationalization of accounting for at-themoney NQSOs per SFAS 123R will revitalize the use of SARs, or whether the
remaining difference as described herein will result in a continued preference for
options.
161
See SFAS 123R, supra note 6155, ¶ B45 (“Concerns about how to apply
option-pricing models initially developed for traded options to forfeitable,
nontransferable employee options are much less significant if final measurement is
based on the intrinsic value, if any, that an employee realizes by exercising an
option.”).
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were convinced that firms were using the discretion inherent in the
option pricing models to minimize compensation expense, that factor
might persuade them to reverse course. As noted above, there is
evidence of valuation manipulation of footnoted option expense prior to
the promulgation of SFAS 123R.162 It is too early for researchers to
have produced evidence of manipulation in the new era, but the
incentive to manipulate is even greater today.
Although the FASB has disclaimed any intention of including nonaccounting considerations in its deliberations,163 this position should not
deter the group from taking susceptibility of manipulation into account
in weighing the pros and cons of various measurement alternatives.
Ultimately, the potential for manipulation bears on the accuracy,
repeatability, and value-relevance of financial statements, which the
FASB has pledged to uphold.164
However, if the FASB cannot be convinced to adopt the SAR
accounting approach for options, Congress or the SEC would have to
intervene to conform book to tax. While Congress revises the tax code
at the drop of hat, it has rarely intervened in financial accounting
matters, and we should be hesitant to encourage Congress to intervene.
As one of us has argued elsewhere, congressional meddling in GAAP
raises numerous concerns including the potential introduction of
significantly greater lobbying effort into the standard setting process and
capture of the process by the interest group with the most at stake,
corporate management.165 It is entirely possible that if this question
were brought before Congress the result could be reversal of SFAS 123R
and a return to optional expensing of options rather than conforming
option expense to tax.
3. A New Line Drawing Problem – Restricted Stock
However, even if the FASB could be convinced to adjust the
measurement date for options, we must be careful that eliminating an
inconsistency between options and SARs does not introduce another
distortion in corporate compensation arrangements and, if options are
162

See supra Part III.A.2.
See, e.g., FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., EXPOSURE DRAFT: SHARE-BASED PAYMENT
(Mar. 31, 2004), at C33 & 34 (noting that the FASB is required “to consider issues in
an evenhanded manner, without attempting to encourage or discourage specific
actions” and rejecting as irrelevant arguments that expensing stock options would have
adverse economic consequences in causing firms to “reduce, eliminate, or otherwise
revise” option programs”).
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See FACTS ABOUT FASB, supra note 159.
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See Walker, supra note 39, at y; see also Shaviro, supra note 2 (voicing
concern with congressional involvement in the accounting standard setting process).
(DW – page cite for your Financial Accounting article?)
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accounted for like SARs, think about where the new line will be drawn
between accounting based on expectation and realization. Consider
restricted stock. Under current GAAP, the grant date value of restricted
stock is recognized as an expense, which is allocated ratably across the
vesting period.166 This approach is, of course, consistent with the
current treatment of options. For restricted stock, the grant date value is
simply the fair market value of unrestricted stock – vesting and
restrictions on transferability are ignored in determining value –
although expense is not recognized for shares that fail to vest.167
It is certainly feasible, although perhaps less defensible, to switch to
an “SAR approach” in expensing restricted stock. The instruments
could be marked to market in each period between grant and vesting,
such that the cumulative expenses reported to investors in proxy and
financial statements would equate to the market values of the stock on
vesting. But this would result in an accounting line being drawn
between unrestricted and restricted stock, as unrestricted stock granted
as compensation would certainly be expensed at its grant date value.
Lack of transferability seems a thin basis for including investment
returns in the compensation expense recognized with respect to
restricted but not unrestricted stock.
The alternative is to draw the accounting line between restricted
stock and options on the basis of the greater uncertainty in valuation and
liability-like characteristics of the latter.168 The concern is that this
approach could result in a distortion in firm preferences between these
two very important compensation devices. In theory, this approach
should not be distorting. Aside from risk, there is no bias between
expected and realized value from the decision maker’s ex ante
perspective.169 However, some firms might prefer the certainty of
expected value based expense recognition; others might prefer that
expense recognition track realized results.170

IV. CONCLUSION
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See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See SFAS 123R, supra note 6, ¶ 21.
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See Kirschenheiter et al., supra note 156 (advocating treating options as
liabilities for accounting purposes, but not share grants).
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See supra Part III.A.1.
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In one respect, drawing the line between stock options and restricted stock
could reduce a distortion in accounting choice. Option expense currently is
manipulable; restricted stock expense is not. That favors options over stock. If
conforming option expense with SARs and tax treatment reduces the incentive to game
expense recognition, that distortion is reduced.
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There is no free lunch here. As we have seen, increasing conformity
along one axis to reduce the gaming of reported earnings may facilitate
gaming of corporate tax deductions. Conforming employee and
employer tax treatment with GAAP raises concerns about liquidity,
fairness, and manipulation. Any move may affect tax- and accountinginduced distortions in the selection of equity instruments.
Given all of these tradeoffs, it is not obvious which of the three
equity compensation tax, disclosure, and accounting regimes discussed
in this Article is superior – status quo, tax conformed to book, or book
conformed to tax. To us, however, it is a realistic possibility that current
proposals to conform tax to book represent the third best of these three
options and that the status quo may well be the best.
For proponents of comprehensive book/tax conformity, the question
must be whether equity compensation should fall under the default rule,
i.e., its tax treatment conformed to book, or whether it should stand as an
exception. It is not clear within the context of the overall book/tax gap
that equity compensation is a serious problem. To be sure, it has
historically represented a large fraction of the gap in raw numbers, but
SFAS 123R will largely eliminate the aggregate options gap. Moreover,
the book/tax difference attributable to stock options is readily
identifiable firm by firm; it does not appear to contribute to the lack of
transparency and difficulty in identifying the source of the overall gap
between a firm’s book and taxable income.
We certainly see little value in conforming corporate taxation of
options to book as a one-off project. Where is the incremental value in
firm X reporting a book/tax difference of $4 billion post options
conformity versus status quo reporting of a gap of $5 billion, $1 billion
of which is readily attributable to option compensation?
Moreover, to the extent that we are concerned with continued
manipulation of option valuation for earnings purposes post-SFAS
123R, enhanced disclosure and perhaps specification of the inputs into
option pricing models would appear to be a relatively low cost
corrective. The incremental benefit of conformity does not seem equal
to the cost of 1) forcing employees to accept grant date valuation of
option compensation, 2) introducing the opportunity to game the tax
deduction for options, and/or 3) introducing a distortion into the
public/private decision as a result of differentiated option taxation.
On the other hand, we think it possible that the status quo could be
improved upon by adjusting the accounting treatment of options to
match that of stock appreciation rights. This change would result in
realization-based valuation for the purposes of accounting, employee
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tax, employer tax, and executive compensation disclosure; and it would
place a check on gaming option expense recognition. However, we are
concerned that this reform might drive a wedge between options and
restricted stock. Moreover, implementation requires that the FASB
reverse course (perhaps unlikely) or that the SEC or Congress intervene
(perhaps undesirable). Given the potential unintended consequences and
what we view as minimal concerns with equity compensation post-SFAS
123R, we do not see a strong driving force for departing from the status
quo.
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